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Abstract 
IT Fornebu is an ambiguous attempt to build, more or less from scratch, a Norwegian IT-, 
knowledge- and innovation centre, with the overall objective to be a node in the national 
network, by amongst others providing support for entrepreneurial activity throughout the 
country, making the whole nation function as some sort of gigantic ICT-cluster, where 
“clustering functions” are established without the companies involved being in geographical 
proximity. This dissertation has several major findings. The most surprising discovery is that 
the Norwegian state-owned phone company Telenor’s choice of Fornebu as the site for its 
new main office, has been vital for the idea about establishing an IT- and knowledge centre. 
From a theoretical perspective the most considerable finding is that “techno-economic 
paradigm”-concept of Carlota Perez and Christopher Freeman is not a coherent theory, mainly 
because of the weaknesses connected to the theoretical conceptions on which it allegedly is 
founded. What can be seen as a sensational detection, is that the “techno-economic 
paradigm”-concept promoted by Norsk Investorforum, the foundation behind IT Fornebu, is 
not identical to that of Carlota Perez, despite the claim that this is the case. Finally, it can be 
argued that the extremely intimate co-operational interaction between the political and the 
private actors advocating IT Fornebu, is emanating from a shared fundamental faith in 
information technology as a revolutionary and transforming power. A quite complex network 
of alliances between major actors in the Norwegian business- and political life has been 
revealed during the work with this thesis, and it could be implied that the establishment of IT 
Fornebu is a result of interaction between many parties, which through IT Fornebu did find a 
common means of accomplishing separate goals. 
 
 
Keywords: ICT-cluster; Political process; “Long waves”; “Technological paradigms”;  
“Techno-economic paradigms”;
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2 Introduction: The Fornebu Story 
                                                
2.1 Establishing an IT cluster 
In year 2000, a group of Norwegian entrepreneurs gained control of what has been described 
as the most valuable piece of real estate in Norway, formerly owned by the national and local 
governments, with the objective of establishing a major IT cluster1 in the Oslo region. In order 
to do this they undertook a major lobbying effort, they mobilised a Parliamentary coalition 
involving an alliance between the social democratic party and an ultra right wing neo-liberal 
and anti immigration party, and they promoted ideas directly drawn from modern innovation 
studies as the “rationale” for their activity. This thesis explores how this process occurred.     
2.2 Pristine land 
The stage setting for this sequence of events is Snarøya, a peninsula 8 km south west of the 
centre of the Norwegian capital Oslo. For 59 years, from June 1st 1939 till October 4th 1998, 
this was the site of Oslo International Airport, also called Fornebu airport after the area where 
it was founded. The name Fornebu dates back to the Norse era and a plausible interpretation 
of the word is old primitive house 2, which is a pronounced contrast to what is presently 
planned for the area, namely “to create a World Class Knowledge and Innovation 
Community..”3. The Fornebu land, which constitutes the major part of Snarøya, approximates 
to more than 810 acres of exquisite site, at present perhaps the most valuable property area in 
Norway. Due to the favourable location in the inner Oslo fjord between the Lysaker fjord and 
the narrow bay Holtekilen, the Fornebu land is surrounded by kilometres of more or less 
pristine coastline, including several bird sanctuaries, traditionally used by locals for outdoor 
life and recreation.  
 
1 major IT-cluster in Norwegian standards, is a very small cluster in European standards, 
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2.3 Moving the airport and reallocation 
On October 8th 1992, the Norwegian parliament, Stortinget, decided to move the International 
airport from Fornebu to Gardermoen, 50 kilometres north of Oslo. The date set for closing 
down Fornebu airport and to inaugurate the new Oslo International Airport at Gardermoen, 
was October 8th 1998. This date did not just represent the end of an epoch for the Fornebu 
land, but it also symbolised the conception of a new era for the whole Snarøya peninsula. An 
era where this beautiful piece of land would be freed to serve other purposes, but not the least 
freed from the noise the area had been cursed with for nearly 60 years. Then of course, the 
question about what to do with the area arose. Among propositions which were discussed 
were harbour, bird sanctuary, aquarium, the new localisation of the Norwegian state owned 
television company NRK and Norwegian film industry, World Exhibition, Centre of 
Environmental technology, Olympics 2008, Space and Subsea technology Centre, 
International Centre of Peace, hospital and technical high school4. In order to cope with all the 
incoming suggestions and elucidate Fornebu after-use a task force was appointed. A central 
member of this task force was civil engineer Jon Holt, manager and owner of the civil 
engineering company Byggholt AS. 
2.4 IT-centre emerging 
The idea about creating an IT-and knowledge centre at Fornebu can more or less be said to 
have been conceived in May 1995, as Jon Holt, manager of Byggholt, suggested for Tormod 
Hermansen, the top manager of the Norwegian State owned phone company Telenor, that 
Fornebu was a brilliant site for Telenor’s new gigantic main office, a proposition Hermansen 
enthusiastically approved. During their conversations Hermansen and Holt lined up a scheme 
where Telenor’s main office should be the locomotive in an information-and communication 
                                                                                                                                                         
2 Aschehoug og Gyldendals Store Norske leksikon,  Fornebu, page 377, first column 1), 
3 found at web site:http://www.it-fornebu.no/artikkel.asp?id=23, 21.03.00, 20:44 hrs, 55), 
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technological (ICT) cluster5. In the early fall 1995 Telenor’s plans concerning building a new 
head office at Fornebu leaked out resulting in the duo Holt/Hermansen facing competition. 
When the news broke about Telenor planning to build its new main office at Fornebu, Norsk 
Investorforum, a Norwegian foundation of well-of investors, started to work for the creation 
of an information technology centre at Fornebu. And in November 1995, Norsk Investorforum 
(NIFO) was engaged by Statsbygg6 in order to “elucidate the possibilities for 
industry/business establishments”7 at the Fornebu airport area. In January 1996 NIFO 
presented the report, clearly recommending the establishment of an information technology 
(IT) centre at Fornebu8. The report however, was not a thorough “elucidation of possibilities”, 
but rather a pre project outline of IT Fornebu, the IT-centre NIFO itself wanted to create. At 
that time the Government in office was constituted by the Norwegian Labour Party, Ap, 
which was strongly in favour of the IT Fornebu project. Everything taken into consideration, 
the possibility of conflicting interests was imminent, but it was not until the spring of 1997 
that the newspapers became the battlefield for the combat over the Fornebu land. The big 
issue of the fight was whether or not to establish an IT-centre at Fornebu. Interestingly enough 
the representatives for the Norwegian IT-industry were to be found among the opponents to 
the creation of an IT –centre at Fornebu, but also the leading national researchers dealing with 
innovation and innovation systems were against, despite the fact that NIFO asserted to have a 
theoretical “rationale” for developing such a centre9. 
                                                                                                                                                         
4 Interview and e-mail from plansjef Hans Kristian Lingsom in Bærum County,  
5 Interview with Jon Holt summer 2000,  
6 Statsbygg is an agency administering state construction, 
7 Norsk Investorforum publication 12), page 5, lines 17 and 18, my translation, and also interview with Per 
Morten Vigtel, spring 2000,  
8 Norsk Investorforum publication 12), whole report, 
9 Several newspaper articles, copies in folders, 52), 
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2.5 Theoretical “rationale” 
Norsk Investorforum, NIFO, claimed to build its world view on a comprehensive intellectual 
basis of ideas which purport to challenge orthodox economic policy10. This basis of ideas is 
allegedly drawn from evolutionary economy, with special reference to the “techno-economic 
paradigm”-concept of Carlota Perez and Christopher Freeman. According to Perez and 
Freeman we are presently experiencing the emergence of the fifth “techno-economic 
paradigm”, see table 4.1, where the key technologies are considered to be information – and 
biotechnology, apparently indicating that investments in information technology (IT) is one of 
the key issues to prosperity and economic growth in our time11. It can be argued that a 
fundamental faith in IT as a revolutionary and transforming power has been a vital aspect for 
the justification of the establishment of IT Fornebu. The argumentation goes as follows: The 
Norwegian economy is very dependent on natural resources, which is especially dangerous 
taking into account that we presently find ourselves in the middle of the “techno-economic 
paradigm” shift between the industrial/mass production society and the 
information/knowledge society. Establishing an IT-and knowledge centre would reduce the 
risk of Norway lagging behind in the emerging “techno-economic paradigm”, where 
knowledge and information technology is far more important than natural resources12. This is 
very much in line with what is written in the Norwegian official IT-plan for the period 1998-
2001, which states that “the future competitive advantage will be concentrated around 
knowledge and the power of thought, and not machinery, equipment and natural resources, 
and that this will change our view of what value creation is”13. But, despite the resemblance in 
the “theoretical” apprehension, the political progress for NIFO in promoting IT Fornebu was 
slow, and it was not until the summer of 1997 that things started to happen.  
                                                 
10 Interview with Per Morten Vigtel and Erik Reinert, spring 2000,  
11 C. Freeman and C. Perez, 6), 
12 Interview with Erik S. Reinert,  
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2.6 Political complications 
In September the same year, election for parliament was due, revealing that a change in the 
political climate had occurred, resulting in the abdication of the Labour Party, and the forming 
of a new Government constituted by three smaller parties positioned around the political 
centre; Venstre (V), Kristelig Folkeparti (Krf) and Senterpartiet (Sp). With the new 
Government, Bondevik-regjeringen, which counted only 42 of the 165 representatives in the 
Norwegian Parliament, the working conditions for NIFO changed radically, very well 
illustrated by the newly nominated Minister of Trade and Industry, Lars Sponheim, who, the 
day after the constitution, announced that he would not “pay a krone to an IT-centre at 
Fornebu”14. Despite this, later that year, December 11th to be exact, it was agreed by all 
political parties except the left wing, Sosialistisk Venstreparti, SV, that a national IT-and 
knowledge centre should be developed at Fornebu. The official decision in Stortinget did not, 
however, speed up the political process around the establishment of an IT-centre at Fornebu. 
According to representatives of NIFO and several politicians, the new Government, even 
though they on December 11th had voted for an IT-centre, worked against the establishment, 
something which was strongly denied by the representatives for the Government. 
2.7 Actors and decision 
Since Norway is a member of European Free Trade Association, EFTA, the development of 
the IT-and knowledge centre at Fornebu had to be treated in accordance with the EEA 
(European Economic Area)-regulations. The new Government maintained that these 
regulations forced them to invite tenders, and in order to do so they worked out a general 
outline for interested parties to “bid” on. What the “bidding” consisted of, was to deliver a 
project description of the IT-centre the party wanted to develop at Fornebu, and then the 
                                                                                                                                                         
13 Nærings og Handelsdepartementet, Næringsrettet IT-plan for perioden 1998-2001, 37), Forord, lines 5 and 6, 
my translation,  
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Government was to decide which tender they preferred. Several tenders showed interest in the 
project, but in the fall of 1999 only two competitors were left; IT Fornebu Technoport and 
Nettverk Fornebu. While the Government negotiated with the two competitors, the majority in 
Stortinget, consisting of the Norwegian Labour Party, Ap, and Fremskrittspartiet (Progress 
Party), Frp, an ultra right wing neo-liberal and anti immigration party, had settled for IT 
Fornebu Technoport. When in January 2000, the Government announced Nettverk Fornebu to 
be its candidate, Stortinget did not accept this, and demanded a public enquiry about the IT-
centre at Fornebu. The enquiry was held February 7th. Neither Frp nor Ap changed their minds 
during the enquiry, something which lead to the fall of the governmental proposition in 
Stortinget March 7th, 2000. The two strange bedfellows Ap and Frp had ensured that IT 
Fornebu Technoport won the battle of Fornebu.  
2.8 Methodology and Content of Dissertation 
The objective of this dissertation is to explore the process regarding how it was decided to 
develop the IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre IT Fornebu, at Fornebu. This will be 
accomplished by endeavour open the “black box”15 IT Fornebu as much as possible, the time 
and means given, and in order to do so the point of departure will be an imaginary initial 
picture of IT Fornebu, and by observing the IT Fornebu project through interviews, official 
documents, publications, papers, books, newspaper articles and presentations in other media 
like television, radio and Internet, the picture will change in a constant interaction with the 
surroundings and eventually end up closer to the “real” IT Fornebu, see figure 1.1. It could be 
argued that the “real” IT Fornebu does not exists, as the apprehension a person gets of an 
object, or in this case of IT Fornebu, is dependent of this persons point of view, its 
expectations, educational background, culture etc., but, none the less, it is likely that the final 
                                                                                                                                                         
14 Asker og Bærums Budstikke, 20.10.97, -Ikke en krone til IT Fornebu-, 49), 
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 Figure 1.1  Interactive IT Fornebu map16 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Feedback loop 
Observations 
“real” IT Fornebu  Initial picture 
of IT Fornebu 
 
 
 
version of IT Fornebu, after the process of observation and interaction, is closer to the “truth” 
than the initial version. Further the conclusions in this dissertation will be endeavoured drawn 
within the conceptual framework of the “social shaping approach”17.  
 
As a means of accomplishing the objective of this thesis  
i) the theoretical background of Norsk Investorforum, NIFO, and the arguments used to 
justify the establishment of IT Fornebu will be investigated, 
i) the actors involved and the roles they allegedly play will be illuminated, 
ii) the political struggle in the Norwegian parliament will be accounted for, 
iii) the plan and the components of the IT Fornebu project will be described.  
 
In addition the process around the moving of the Fornebu airport and the reallocation of the 
site will be briefly outlined, and the background of Norsk Investorforum and the emergence of 
the IT Fornebu idea will also be accounted for.  
 
 
 
15 “Black box” primarily denotes that the object in question is dealt with without questioning the qualities it 
possesses, and without analysing the different aspects of the object,    
16 The IT Fornebu map is made after model of the world map de Vries described during lecture September 13th 
1999, at the ESST course. 
17 Grint & Woolgar, pages 18 to 25, 7), 
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3 Moving the airport and reallocating the site  
                                                
3.1 Historical review  
When the Fornebu airport was founded in 1939, no one had imagined to what extent the air 
born traffic would increase within the next few decades. Only 20 years after its infant 
beginning, the airport had reached its bounds of possibility, and the Norwegian authorities 
realised that something had to be done. As a result of this, in 1968, only 4 years after the 
inauguration of the new registration building, a committee was appointed in order to 
investigate future needs. Based on the report made by the committee, the Norwegian 
parliament, Stortinget, in 1971, carried a motion stating that as for now Fornebu should 
continue to be the main airport of Norway, but in order to avoid overload at Fornebu, the air 
born charter traffic should be transferred to the military airport at Gardermoen. In addition it 
was decided, when Gardermoen and Fornebu reached their capacity limit, to build a new main 
airport at Hobøl, a small county east of Oslo. During the 1970-ties the traffic increase 
stagnated, and the need for a new main airport was not considered to be impending. In the 
1980-ties however, the aeroplane traffic again grew rapidly, and a new analysis was made in 
1985. As a result of this it was, in 1988, decided to build a new main airport at Hurum, south-
west of Oslo18.  
 
The motion carried was controversial and the decision in Stortinget was made against the will 
of the Labour Party Government, which wanted the new international airport to be built at 
Gardermoen, 50 km north of Oslo. And despite what was decided about Hurum, the 
 
18 web site: http://www.osl.no:81/osl_info/fakta_om_flyplassen/historie.html, 23.03.2000, 58), 
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Government never stopped working for Gardermoen19. In 1990 a new motion was carried in 
Stortinget. Weather measurements indicated that crosswind combined with uneven visibility 
would not give Hurum the necessary accessibility. The development of Hurum as the site for 
the main airport stopped, and an analysis for building a new main airport at Gardermoen was 
initiated. 
 
The decision in Stortinget  caused a revolt among the supporters of Hurum, and brought about 
an immense political fight. Some people claim that the main airport battle caused hostility, 
hatred, bankruptcy and personal tragedy20. As an attempt to calm things down, a state born 
commission was established in order to evaluate the measurements recorded at Hurum. This 
investigation concluded that everything had been handled correctly. Later, however, it turned 
out that the data gathered at Hurum were not representative, and some people maintain that 
scientists with expert knowledge that would undermine Gardermoen as the main airport, at the 
time, were threatened to silence21.  
 
Despite all this, on October 8th 1992, Stortinget carried a motion about building the new 
Norwegian International Airport at Gardermoen, a decision which was never subsequently 
modified. And by this, the last chapter in the history of Fornebu Airport, had begun. The 
resolution, however, also laid the premises for the future development at Fornebu. First, 
directly, by stating that the site was to be used for accommodation, business development and 
recreation, and secondly, indirectly, by initiating several Rikspolitiske Retningslinjer (national 
political instructions), RPR’s22. These RPR’s should include detailed directions for future 
development of the Fornebu land. Based on these RPR’s the Government on August 30. 1993, 
                                                 
19 Ebbe Ording, Historien om Gardermoen: Et nasjonalt bedrageri, , p. 133 &134, 14), 
20 Ebbe Ording, p. 261, from line 24 to p. 262 line 34, p. 31 last section & p. 32 top section, 14), 
21 Ebbe Ording, p. 204, p 124&125, Meterologen for Hurum, 14), 
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carried that the Fornebu area should be developed in consistence with surrounding areas, the 
county and the region. In addition business development should primarily be restricted to 
areas where buildings already existed, and the coastline and other pristine areas should be 
reserved for outdoor life and recreation23.  
3.2 The regulation plan 
The Fornebu land was split between two owners, the Norwegian State and Oslo Borough 
County, where the Norwegian State accounted for about 445 acres and Oslo for about 355 
acres. January 1st 1995, the Norwegian state-owned part of the Fornebu land, including 
buildings, was officially conveyed to Statsbygg, the company normally managing the 
Norwegian state-owned property. As a result of this Statsbygg, in the end of 1995, circulated 
for comments a public enquiry concerning future development at Fornebu. This was done as a 
part of an analysis of consequences imposed on the landowners by the Norwegian Plan and 
Building Regulation in order to elucidate possible effects of Fornebu “after-use” on 
environment, natural resources and society24. Based on the comments Statsbygg received on 
the enquiry, and reports made separately by the two owners, the Ministry of Labour and 
Government Administration and the Ministry of Environmental Affairs established a joint 
consequential programme for both owners in June 199625. 
 
Included in the Norwegian state property was also the land underlying the existing airport 
buildings, which meant, considering the RPR’s, that the business development at Fornebu 
primarily would take place on state-owned grounds. But still the Norwegian State could not 
                                                                                                                                                         
22 Kommunedelplan 2 for Fornebu-området, høringsdokument 19.04.99, Bærum County, Rådmannen, p.4 to 7, 
34), 
23 Statsbygg og Oslo County, Etterbruk av Fornebu, Konsekvensutredning etter plan-og bygningslovens§33, 
Oslo juni 1996, Section 5, 1. Bakgrunn – sentrale forutsetninger, 22), 
24 Kommunedelplan 2 for Fornebu-området, høringsdokument 19.04.99, Bærum County, Rådmannen, p.7, 34) 
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decide what business to evolve without interference. The Fornebu land was as mentioned 
earlier, part of the Bærum County territory, over which Bærum County Council traditionally 
had the local authority. At an early stage discussions went on in Stortinget concerning 
whether the regulating authority over Fornebu ought to be transferred to the State, but Bærum 
County Council rejected this at the strongest, and the majority in Stortinget chose not to 
declare Bærum County Council  incapable of managing its own affairs. Bærum County 
Council was therefore responsible for making a full-fledged regulation plan for the Fornebu 
area, and in order to fulfil its obligations Bærum County Council initiated several expositions 
about future use of the Fornebu land, but it can be argued that especially two reports may have 
been of significance for the reallocation of the site26.  
 
The first is a report treating business development and employment, dated September 1992, 
which concluded that the Fornebu “after-use” should take advantage of, and develop further, 
the “high technology” business already situated in the proximity to the Fornebu area27, and 
secondly an exposition completed in October 1993, about business "green houses" or 
incubators and how new entrepreneurial activity could be promoted in Bærum County and the 
surrounding area28.  
 
The regulation plan for the Fornebu area was made in two steps. First a preliminary plan, 
Kommunedelplan 1, which was a broad plan describing the main features for the area, was 
made and circulated for comments. Kommunedelplan 2, which represented the second and 
final step in the development of a regulatory plan for the Fornebu area, was a much more 
                                                                                                                                                         
25 Web address 
http://www.baerum.kommune.no/prosjekter/fornebu/sentrale_dok/konsekvensutredning/konsekvens.htm, date 
22032000, 10:49 hrs, Section 2. Sammendrag and Section 3. Innledning, 59) 
26 Interview with plansjef Hans Kristian Lingsom i Bærum County,  
27 Melding om næringsutvikling og sysselsetting 36), 
28 “Drivhus”?,  29.10.93, 24), 
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detailed report which was based on political resolutions, both national and local, and several 
thorough expositions and analysis’29. When, Kommunedelplan 2, in April 1999, was 
circulated for comments, it was especially two things which had been deepened since 
Kommunedelplan 1 was endorsed by Bærum County Council in November 1996. First a 
paragraph concerning the establishment of an internationally attractive It- and Knowledge 
centre was included, on behalf of a more general instruction about high technology activity, 
and secondly the earlier vague utterance concerning arrangements for collective transportation 
had now become an injunction about building collective communication on rails in order to 
serve the Fornebu area. An injunction which prohibited the development of an IT-and 
knowledge centre at Fornebu before a motion concerning transportation on rails serving the 
Fornebu area, was carried in the Norwegian Parliament, Stortinget30. June 16th 1999, 
Kommunedelplan 2 was endorsed by Bærum County Council. 
                                                 
29 Kommunedelplan 2 for Fornebu-området, p.4, 34), 
30 Kommunedelplan 2, Fornebu area, 34), page 17, Kollektivsystem, page 44, Kollektivtransport, 
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4 The emergence of an IT-and knowledge centre 
                                                
4.1 The idea about an ICT-cluster 
One of the important sources of income for Bærum County has for several years been the area 
where the Fornebu land is attached to the mainland. The area has been nicknamed 
“engineering valley” due to a very high density of engineering companies. When, in the end 
of 1980, it was a general depression in Norway, which also affected the activity in “the 
engineering valley”, a general concern started to rise in Bærum County Council. During the 
following years several expositions concerning compensational efforts were initiated, treating 
both business development and employment, business “hothouse” and Fornebu after-use. As 
mentioned earlier, the conclusion which can be drawn from all these reports, is that Bærum 
County Council wanted internationally attractive engineering and “high technology” activity, 
including higher education and a “hothouse” impelling entrepreneurial activity, to be 
established at Fornebu. During the fall of 1994 Bærum County Council tried really hard to get 
international companies interested in establishing business at Fornebu31, they also contacted 
Statsbygg in order to establish an engineering school at Fornebu. But when the ball really 
started to roll was when Telenor, the Norwegian state owned phone company, entered the 
scene wanting to build its new main office, housing between 4 and 6 thousand employees, at 
Fornebu.  
 
It was in Bergen in May 1995 that the idea about Telenor establishing at Fornebu was 
conceived32. At a conference arranged by the Norwegian school of Economics and Business 
Administration, Tormod Hermansen, the top manager of Telenor, and Jon Holt, manager and 
 
31 Interview with Hans Kristian Lingsom,  
32 Interview with Jon Holt, 
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owner of the civil engineering company Byggholt AS, sat and chatted informally. Hermansen 
asked Holt if he, since he was in estate business, knew about a favourable site on which 
Telenor could build its new main office. At the time being Jon Holt worked in a task force 
appointed by Bærum County Council with the mission to elucidate Fornebu after-use. Two 
days after the meeting in Bergen, Holt got back to Hermansen suggesting Fornebu to be the 
site of Telenor’s new gigantic main office, resulting in Hermansen giving Byggholt AS the 
task to make a report on this, which he could present for the Telenor board. During their 
discussions concerning the new main office, Hermansen and Holt had outlined a scheme 
where Telenor’s main office should be the locomotive of an information-and communication 
technological (ICT) cluster33. Telenor, which is a world leading company in exploiting 
untraditional technological solutions when building telecommunication infrastructure under 
difficult topographic conditions, assess it to be of vital importance for its future 
competitiveness internationally, to be a part of an ICT-cluster34. To be located in an ICT-
cluster ostensibly would improve Telenor’s competitiveness in two ways: first being 
surrounded by a variety of creative companies might help Telenor exploit new technologies 
and prevent “lock in”35, and secondly, a co-localisation with a university might improve the 
Norwegian educational programme in telecommunication, as Telenor would be able to 
contribute to salary raise and better working conditions for the researchers and the professors 
at the university. In the early fall 1995 the news about Telenor planning to raise its new palace 
at Fornebu leaked out to the press, and the duo Holt/Hermansen was no longer alone in their 
thinking about an ICT-centre at Fornebu. 
                                                 
33 This is a cluster in Norwegian standards, which is quite small, and cannot be compared to that of Silicon 
Valley, 
34 Interview with Visekonsernsjef Ole Petter Håkonsen i Telenor, 
35 Here “lock in” denotes that the use of and the familiarity with “old” technologies prevents Telenor exploiting 
“new” technologies in problem solving,   
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4.2 IT Fornebu and Norsk Investorforum 
The idea about IT Fornebu appears to have been born in Oslo, the Capital of Norway, at the 
office of Fred. Olsen, the successful director an old shipping company named Fred. Olsen & 
Co. Fred Olsen, who is an extremely wealthy man, has a range of business interests, and a 
long history of close connections to the Labour party and to the main Norwegian union 
organisation, LO., and his companies have in the past been used as ‘national champions’ in 
key sectors, such as offshore36. According to Fred. Olsen37, it was during an informal meeting 
between Per Morten Vigtel, the leader of Norsk Investorforum, NIFO, Håkon Gundersen, a 
project leader in NIFO, and himself, that the idea about an information technology centre at 
Fornebu “just popped up from who knows where”.  
 
Per Morten Vigtel had, as the director of Norsk Rederiforbund38, for several years been 
interacting with Fred. Olsen, and when Vigtel resigned from his position in Rederiforbundet 
in 1994 in order to found Norsk Investorforum, NIFO, a business life organisation for well-off 
long-term investors, two of Fred. Olsen’s companies joined as members. Per Morten Vigtel’s 
purpose for establishing NIFO, was to create a business life organisation with the aim to 
change the economy-and industry policy through projects in network39, rather than in 
hierarchies with stable and distinct limits. Apparently the necessary changes in the Norwegian 
trade- and industry policy will be illuminated as the projects are realised, and the importance 
of NIFO’s members, who invest in the projects, will be demonstrated. NIFO’s mission is to 
fulfil the task of promoting a “culture of creation by cultivating talents, abundance of ideas 
and diversity of private sources of capital”, and, to follow a strategy in “creating a lighthouse 
with high attractive force by making the public and private customers invest in new highly 
                                                 
36 See section 5.4.2, 
37 Interview with Fred.Olsen, 
38 the Norwegian interest organisation for ship owners 
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developed solutions”40. The membership fee in NIFO is NOK50000, and by June 2000 it had 
39 paying members41.  
 
After the idea about IT Fornebu had been pronounced, Per Morten Vigtel contacted Statsbygg 
in order to get the mission to investigate possible future activities for the Fornebu area. In 
November 1995, NIFO was officially engaged by Statsbygg and given the task to “elucidate 
the possibilities for industry/business establishments”42 of the Fornebu airport area. In January 
1996 NIFO presented its report, clearly recommending the establishment of an information 
technology (IT) centre with project name IT Fornebu, also implying that if NIFO’s project 
outline was followed, this centre would be the “most attractive IT-centre in Europe by year 
2005”43. However, the report was not a thorough “elucidation of possibilities”, but rather a 
promotion of its own idea about the establishment of IT Fornebu. According to the leader of 
NIFO, Per Morten Vigtel, the report was not exactly what Statsbygg had expected, something 
which caused it to be more or less ignored by Statsbygg44. NIFO sent the report to the 
Ministry of Trade-and Industry resulting in a meeting in April 1996. The Ministry responded 
politely, but had severe doubts to whether anyone would invest money in such a project.  
4.3 Competing ideas? 
In the beginning of October the same year a meeting was held between Jens Stoltenberg, the 
Minister of Trade and Industry, and Jon Holt, Tormod Hermansen, and Kjeld Rimberg45 
concerning the previously mentioned ICT-cluster they wanted to establish around Telenor at 
                                                                                                                                                         
39 Interview with Per Morten Vigtel, leader of NIFO,  
40 Norsk Investorforum publication nb.1, 1999, Årsberetning 1998-99, 13), p.1, lines 31 to 34, my translation, 
41 http://www.nifo.no/organisasjonen/ab.html, 01.10.00, 02:27 hrs, 65), 
42 Norsk Investorforum, 12), page 5, lines 17 and 18, my translation, and also interview with Per Morten Vigtel,  
43 Norsk Investorforum home page: http://www.it-fornebu.no, 13.09.2000, 22:58 hrs, top right corner, 61), 
44 Interview with Per Morten Vigtel and e-mail and talk with Sverre Nagel Bjordal, responsible in Statsbygg at 
the time, 
45 Kjeld Rimerg is a person involved in several public and half public Norwegian companies and institutions, and 
at present he amongst others is the leader of the board in Forskningsparken AS, see chapter 6,and 7,    
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Fornebu. The meeting had been a very positive one, and two weeks later a letter signed Holt, 
Hermansen and Rimberg referring to the meeting, was sent to the Minister suggesting the 
establishment of a joint public and private company with the objective to create a sustainable 
businesslike IT-, data- and telecommunication milieu at Fornebu. The letter was never 
answered and the initiative taken by the trio Holt/Hermansen/Rimberg fell, partly due to the 
fact that a new government was appointed and a new Minister of Trade and Industry, Grete 
Knudsen, entered office. At a later stage she denied any knowledge of the letter despite the 
fact that she had signed it for read, something which caused speculations in the media 
concerning whether alliances with Fred. Olsen had been conductive to the ignorance of the 
suggestion from above mentioned trio46. 
 
However, another meeting, which also was summoned in October 1996, was a new meeting 
between NIFO and Statsbygg, but this time the entrepreneurial spirited shipping director Fred. 
Olsen had agreed to attend in order to give IT Fornebu credibility. Fred. Olsen apparently told 
the responsible in Statsbygg that he was willing, on behalf of a group of investors, to invest in 
the IT Fornebu project an amount of NOK500 million47. This reinsurance answered the 
question the Ministry of Trade and Industry had raised some 6 months earlier: someone was 
willing to invest money in IT Fornebu. As a result of this IT Fornebu AS was founded 
October 24th, 1996, and considering the letter Holt, Hermansen, head of Telenor, and Rimberg 
sent the Minister of Trade and Industry a week earlier, Telenor was surprisingly enough the 
largest shareholder to be found among the six initial investors. Why Tormod Hermansen 
chose to join the IT Fornebu project rather than to be loyal to his “business partners”, is hard 
to say, but it could be suggested that Hermansen assessed the IT Fornebu project, at that stage, 
                                                 
46 Norsk Rikskringkasting television programme, Brennpunkt, 53), talk with producer Ebbe Ording spring 2000, 
and interview with Jon Holt, 
47 Interview with Per Morten Vigtel, and interview with Fred. Olsen, 
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to be a faster and less risky way, than his own suggestion, to the creation of the ICT-cluster 
Telenor required.   
 
NIFO had so far given birth to three projects, Start-fondet, a venture fund, IT Fornebu 
Knowation, a company developing net based education, and IT Fornebu. Despite the fact that 
START-fondet was discussed in Stortinget three times before the final approval, it was first 
when the idea about IT Fornebu was published in the press, that people started to be aware of 
Norsk Investorforum, its background and objectives. It eventually became known that the 
projects NIFO initiates and the policy recommendations it suggests, are based “on an 
evolutionary or Schumpeterian economic analysis, emphasising the role of new knowledge, 
technological change, entrepreneur ship and active ownership”48. This allegedly evolutionary 
economic analysis which purport to challenge orthodox economic policy49, will be examined 
in detail in the next chapter. 
 
                                                 
48 Web address http://www.nifo.no/english/index.html, 60), 13.09.2000, 21:25 hrs, lines 8 to 13, 
49 Interview with Per Morten Vigtel and Erik S. Reinert, 
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5 The theoretical foundation of Norsk 
Investorforum 
                                                
5.1 Introduction 
As an important part of its strategy in order to fulfil its mission, NIFO, as mentioned earlier, 
“bases its policy recommendations on an evolutionary or Schumpeterian economic analysis, 
emphasising the role of new knowledge, technological change, entrepreneur ship and active 
ownership”50. This allegedly evolutionary economic analysis which purport to challenge 
orthodox economic policy51, is not just the theoretical foundation of NIFO’s policy 
recommendations, but also a basis for the projects it initiates. A central feature in this 
ostensibly comprehensive conceptual framework on which NIFO builds its world view, is the 
“techno-economic paradigm”-concept of Carlota Perez and Christopher Freeman. According 
to Perez and Freeman we are presently experiencing the emergence of the fifth “techno-
economic paradigm”, see table 4.1, where the key technologies are considered to be 
information – and biotechnology, ostensibly indicating that investments in information 
technology (IT) are one of the key issues to prosperity and economic growth in our time52. 
The person  responsible for the theoretical foundation of NIFO, is Erik S. Reinert, the research 
leader of NIFO53, and his, and hence, NIFO’s understanding of the ”techno-economic 
paradigm”- concept, is allegedly thoroughly accounted for in his paper “Det tekno-
økonomiske paradigmeskiftet – konsekvenser for næringspolitikken”54. 
 
 
50 Web address http://www.nifo.no/english/index.html, ref.60), 13.09.2000, 21:25 hrs, lines 8 to 13, 
51 Interview with Per Morten Vigtel and Erik S. Reinert, 
52 Perez & Freeman, The diffusion of Technical Innovations and Changes of Techno-economic Paradigm, 6), 
53 Interview with Per Morten Vigtel, 
54 Erik Reinert, 17), 
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The main objective of chapter 4 is to elucidate the theoretical foundation of NIFO by i) 
discussing the coherence of the “techno-economic paradigm”-concept of Carlota Perez and 
Christopher Freeman, primarily by investigating the components on which it is built: the 
“technological paradigm”-concept of Giovanni Dosi and the “long wave”- concept of 
Kondratieff and Schumpeter, ii) comparing the “techno-economic paradigm”-concept (“TEP”-
concept) as used by NIFO to the “TEP”-concept of Carlota Perez, iii) discussing the 
originality of the arguments provided by NIFO in order to promote IT Fornebu, and finally iv) 
assessing to what extent the “theoretical rationale” of NIFO has been of importance to the IT 
Fornebu project.  
 
To my knowledge, unfortunately little critical work is performed on the “techno-economic 
paradigm”-concept of Carlota Perez and the “technological paradigm”-concept of Giovanni 
Dosi, and the only literature available has been a preliminary draft by Keith Smith and Tine 
Bruland named “Large-scale technological transitions in history and theory “55. Due to the 
lack of critical literature, the word restriction of this dissertation delimits the possibility to 
make a broad and thorough elucidation of the above mentioned conceptions. Because of this 
the aspects which are assessed as most suitable for illustrating the weaknesses of these 
conceptions are discussed. 
5.2 The “techno-economic paradigm”-concept 
5.2.1   Introduction 
The “techno-economic paradigm”-concept, which was conceived by Carlota Perez in the 
beginning of the 1980-ties, is apparently built on among others a combination of the “long 
wave theory” of Nikolai Kondratieff and Joseph A. Schumpeter and the “technological 
                                                 
55 Smith & Bruland, 19), 
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paradigm”-concept of Giovanni Dosi”56. In her “techno-economic paradigm”-concept, Perez 
developed Dosi’s “technological paradigms” further on the socio-economic side, and 
connected these “expanded” “technological paradigms” to the “long wave”-concept, in 
accordance with the understanding that the long range fluctuations appear due to successive 
“technological revolutions”57. By relating the “techno-economic paradigm” to the four 
phases58 of the “long wave” she briefly outlined what happened when a new “techno-
economic paradigm” emerged and replaced the “old”. 
 
In the 1980-ties a collaboration started between Carlota Perez and Christopher Freeman, who 
as one of the most significant writers dealing with innovation and technological change59, had 
worked with “long wave” theory long before the conception of the “techno-economic 
paradigm”-concept. In 1986 Christopher Freeman and Carlota Perez published a joint paper 
called “The Diffusion of Technical Innovations and Changes of Techno-economic Paradigm”, 
with the purpose to among others seek to clarify concepts like “new technology systems”, 
“techno-economic paradigms” and “technological paradigms”60. Their collaboration have so 
far produced five “techno-economic paradigms”, all related to Kondratieff’s “long waves”, to 
main ‘carrier branches’ and to different key factor industries in accordance with Schumpeter’s 
“technological revolutions”,  see table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Freely from Freeman and Soete’s The Economics of Industrial 
Innovation61 
                                                
 
 
56 According to Keith Smith, during councelling, 
57 Perez, 15) page 5,  
58 Perez, 16), page 107, 
59 Keith & Bruland, 19), page 6 
60 Perez &Freeman, 6), page 1, 
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Approx. 
Periodization 
Description Main ‘carrier 
branches’ 
Key factor 
industries 
Infrastructure 
Other sectors 
growing rapidly 
1770 to 1840 Early 
mechanisation 
Kondratieff 
Textiles 
Textile chem. 
Textile mach. 
Iron working and 
iron casting 
Water power 
Potteries 
Cotton 
Pig iron 
 
 
 
Trunk canals 
Turnpike roads 
Steam engines 
Machinery 
1830 to 1890 Steam power and 
railway 
Kondratieff 
Steam engines 
Steam ships 
Machine tools 
Iron 
Railway 
equipment 
Coal 
Transportation 
 
 
Railways 
World shipping 
Steel, Gas, 
Electricity, 
Synthetic 
dyestuffs, 
Heavy 
engineering 
1880 to 1940 Electricity and 
heavy 
engineering 
Electrical eng. 
Electrical mach. 
Cable and wire 
Heavy eng. 
Heavy 
armaments 
Steel ships 
Steel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Automobiles, 
Aircraft, Radio 
Telecom, Oil, 
Aluminium, 
Plastics, 
Consumer 
durables 
                                                                                                                                                         
61 Freeman and Soete, 7), table 3.5, A tentative sketch of the main characteristics of  successive long waves, page 
65,            
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Heavy chem. 
Synth. Dyestuffs 
Electricity supply 
and distribution 
1930 to 1990 Fordist mass 
production 
Kondratieff 
Automobiles 
Trunks 
Tractors 
Tanks 
Armaments for 
motorised 
warfare 
Aircraft 
Consumer 
durables 
Process plant 
Synt. Materials 
Petrochemicals 
Energy 
(especially oil) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Highways 
Airports 
Airlines 
Computers, 
Radar, Drugs, 
NC machine 
tools 
Nuclear weapons 
and power, 
Missiles, 
Microelectronics 
Software 
1980 to ? Information and 
communication 
Kondratieff 
Computers 
El.capital goods 
Software 
Telecom. equip. 
Optical fibres 
Robotics 
FMS 
Ceramics 
Databanks 
Information serv. 
‘Chips’ (micro 
electronics) 
 
 
 
 
Digital 
telecommunicati
ons network 
Satellites 
‘Third 
generation’ 
biotechnology 
products and 
processes, 
Spaceactivities, 
Fine chemicals, 
SDI 
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 As can be seen from table 4.1, the approach is very technologically deterministic, ascribing 
the driving of the waves and hence the emergence of the “techno-economic paradigms” to a 
very narrow range of technologies. The previous “techno-economic paradigm” was apparently 
driven by oil and the products and processes derived from it or exploiting it as fuel, where as 
the present “techno-economic paradigm”, or the “information and communication 
Kondratieff”, is riding the wave on “chips”. 
5.2.2   The “technological paradigm”-concept 
5.2.2.1   “Technological paradigm”, definition 
                                                
The term “technological paradigms ” was first used by Giovanni Dosi early in the 1980-ties62. 
However, using the word paradigm in this manner was not original to Dosi. It was Thomas 
Kuhn who in the beginning of the 1960-ties reinvented the word in his book “The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions”63. Kuhn redefined a paradigm, to denote something which in its 
established usage in a science, signified an accepted model or pattern open to “further 
articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions”64. When Dosi in 1982 
in his article “Technological paradigms and technological trajectories” defined his 
“technological paradigms”, it was in strong analogy to Thomas Kuhn’s “scientific 
paradigms”65. A “technological paradigm” is described to be a ““model” and a “pattern” of 
solution of selected technological problems, based on selected principles derived from natural 
science and on selected material technologies”66, which “embodies strong prescriptions on” 
which directions of technical change to pursue and which to neglect67, where technology is 
 
62 Giovanni Dosi, Technological paradigms and technological trajectories, ref.3), 
63 Thomas S. Kuhn,  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, ref.8), 
64 Thomas S. Kuhn,  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, ref.8), p.23, lines 20 & 21, 
65 Giovanni Dosi, Technological paradigms and technological trajectories, ref.3), p.152, lines 40&41 1st column, 
66 Dosi paper, 3) p.152, first column lines 39 &40, second column lines 1 to 4, 
67 Dosi paper, 3), p.152, second column lines 26 & 27, 
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defined to be “a set of pieces of knowledge, both directly ‘practical’ (related to concrete 
problems and devices) and ‘theoretical’ (but practically applicable although not necessarily 
already applied), know-how, methods, procedures, experience of success and failures and 
also, of course, physical devices and equipment. ...Technology, in this view, includes the 
“perception” of a limited set of possible technological alternatives of notional future 
developments”68. Further Dosi maintains that “the identification of a technological paradigm 
relates to the generic tasks to which it is applied, to the material technology it selects, to the 
physical/chemical properties  it exploits and to the technological and economic dimensions 
and trade-offs it focuses upon”69. In his paper Dosi, unfortunately, does not give any examples 
of a “technological paradigm” and how it is identified, and it could be suggested that it would 
have been enlightening if he had presented relevant examples of specific “technological 
paradigms”, with the objective to demonstrate what a “technological paradigm” actually 
signifies, and how it is identified. 
5.2.2.2   “Technological paradigm”, non-technical factors 
                                                
Another vital aspect when describing the characteristics of “technological paradigms”, is the 
non-technological side of the paradigm: the institutional, social and economic factors, which 
according to Dosi, are likely to influence the rate and direction of technological development. 
In particular he stresses the importance of political forces, by briefly referring to how the 
military and space programmes took part in the development of computers and 
semiconductors70. He also goes as far as to state, concerning the non-technical factors, that if 
his “interpretation of technological change is correct, the emergence of new technological 
paradigms is contextual to the explicit emergence of economically defined “needs””71, where 
 
68 Giovanni Dosi, Technological paradigms and technological trajectories, ref.3),  page151 line 82 to p.152 line 
16, 
69 Dosi paper, 3), page 153, 1st column lines 12-22, 
70 Dosi paper, 3),  p.155, column 1, 
71 Dosi paper, 3), p.156, column 1, lines 45 to 49, 
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the supply-side72 of the market determines how these “needs” are satisfied. In order to explain 
this further Dosi maintains that “economic and social environment affects technological 
development in two ways, first by selecting the “direction of mutation” (i.e. selecting the 
technological paradigm) and then selecting among the mutations in a more darwinian manner 
(i.e. the ex post selection among “schumpeterian” trials and errors)” 73. When using the 
biological metaphor, Dosi is referring to the models of Nelson and Winter describing the 
“evolutionary” mechanisms within the economic environment, and how the “final market 
selection may be equated to the environmental selections of mutations”74, but he also states 
that unlike this, his discussion relates “to the selection of the “mutation generating” 
mechanisms”75. An interesting aspect to note here is that a mutation per definition is random, 
it is however possible to provoke mutations to occur, but it is so far impossible to choose the 
direction of the mutation, implying that the term “selecting the direction of mutation” is 
simply meaningless. And if selection of the “direction of the mutation” is impossible, how can 
the social and economic factors select the “technological paradigm”, given that this is what 
the metaphor “direction of the mutation” reflects? It can be argued that Dosi when using the 
“mutation metaphor” does not offer a plausible explanation concerning how the institutional, 
social and economic environment affects technical development. Even if is explicit that Dosi 
asserts that the development, selection and obsolescence of new technologies interact with 
economic and social conditions, it can be argued that he does not elucidate in a readily 
understandable way, what this relationship consists of and how the interaction occur, and it 
must be evident that the interesting issue is the characteristics of the relationship, and not the 
mere existence. 
                                                 
72 the supply-side of the market denotes producers of products, processes, services etc which deliver to or supply 
the market, 
73 Dosi paper, 3), page 156, column 1, lines 25 to 32, 
74 Dosi paper, 3), p.156 column 1, lines 19 to 21, 
75 Dosi paper, 3), p.156 column 1, lines 23 to 25, 
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5.2.2.3   Comparison between technology and science 
                                                
When Giovanni Dosi is accounting for “normal scientific research” he is referring to Thomas 
Kuhn’s description of the notion76, and according to Kuhn “normal scientific research” is an 
“attempt to force nature into the pre-formed relatively inflexible box that the paradigm 
supplies”77, where “no part of the aim of normal science is call forth new sorts of 
phenomena”78. Additionally he maintains that “nor do scientists normally aim to invent new 
theories” and that “normal scientific research is directed to the articulation of those 
phenomenon and theories that the paradigm already supplies”79. As mentioned earlier, Dosi 
defines technology to be “a set of pieces of knowledge, both directly ‘practical’ and 
‘theoretical’, know-how, methods, procedures, experience of success and failures and also, of 
course, physical devices and equipment.  As Dosi himself points out, it is possible to argue 
that his definition of technology can be interpreted in a way which makes the conceptual 
distance between the attributes of science and the definition of technology tiny80, something 
which Dosi finds suitable for his analysis81.  
 
According to Walter G. Vincenti82 technology is an “autonomous body of knowledge, 
identifiably different from the scientific knowledge with which it interacts”83, and he also 
argues that the relationship through which they (science and technology) interact is not yet 
elucidated84. Ostensibly Dosi is aware that technology and science are not identical 
conceptions85, but he also claims that the validity of the analogy between the two notions can 
 
76 Dosi, 3), page 152, lines 30 to 39, 
77 Kuhn, 8), page 24, lines 14 to 16, 
78 Kuhn, 8), page 24, lines 16 & 17, 
79 Kuhn, 8), page 24, lines 18 to 21, 
80 Dosi, 3), page 152, col.1, 
81 Dosi, 3), p.152, lines 5-17, 
82 Vincenti, W.G, What Engineers Know and How They Know It, 7), pages 4&5, 
83 Vincenti, 7), page 3, lines 31&32, 
84 Vincenti, 7), page 5 
85 Dosi, 3), page 153, 
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be asserted, due to the fact that scientific- and technological activities both represent strong 
selective bodies with powerful heuristics. It can be argued, however, that although technology 
stands on scientific foundations, there is a big gap between scientific research and the 
engineering product86, and that engineering87 is central when accounting for technological 
activity. To more or less ignore engineering activities when dealing with technology, might 
imply a lack of knowledge about technological activity, and increase the risk of “black 
box’ing”88 technology. Given the difference in the nature between “normal science” and 
engineering, where a central feature is to explore new possibilities, push limits and invent new 
things, it does not appear to be very well-considered to define a “technological paradigm” in 
analogy with Thomas Kuhn’s “scientific paradigm”. Of course defining science and 
technology as close as Dosi has done, makes the analogy more plausible, but when Dosi in his 
article also clearly states, that he defines technology with the specific purpose to “explore the 
patterns of technological change”89, one can readily wonder if Dosi here is adapting the input 
in order to get the desirable result. It is not hard to understand why Dosi is tempted to define 
technology in this impressionistic way, when given that the term “technological change” by 
many is regarded as more or less synonymous to economic growth, and hence, the 
understanding of technological change would enable us to predict the behaviour of economic 
growth. This in turn may explain why so many researchers dealing with economic growth and 
innovation, put a lot of effort into developing theories for, and exploring the patterns of 
technological change. Despite this effort, there is so far no general agreement amongst 
researchers, supported by unquestionable empirical evidence, that such a pattern exists, and to 
state it a bit extreme, it might be suggested that there is nearly as many “theories” and 
                                                 
86 Vincenti, 7), page 4, lines 15 & 16, 
87 Vincenti, 7), page 6, lines 12 to 16,“engineering refers to the practice of organising the design and construction 
and operation of any artifice which transforms the physical world around us to meet some recognised need”, 
where organise denotes “bring into being”, “get together” or “arrange”, design has to do with the plans from 
which the artifice is built, and construction is the process where these plans are put into action. 
88 “black boxing” here denotes to deal with technology without analysing all aspects of the conception, 
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“patterns” as there are researchers dealing with the topic. Stanley Metcalfe et.al for instance, 
maintains that “it is the difference in terms of product characteristics between what the 
customer requires, and what innovations de facto supply, which provide a potential to 
influence the rate and direction of technological change”90. Where as Giovanni Dosi claims 
that “there is a complex structure of feed-backs between the economic environment and the 
directions of technological changes”91, and that “a tentative theory of technical change should 
define – in a form as general as possible – the nature of these inter-active mechanisms”. It is 
understandable that it is desirable to elucidate some kind or general theory describing the 
interactive mechanisms of technological change, but given the dispersal and the variety of 
technology and technological activity, it could be argued that generalisation is not feasible, 
and that an attempt to generalise might increase the danger of “black box’ing” technological 
change, something which Dosi himself criticise the “demand-pull theories92” of doing. Of 
course it is possible to develop general applicable theoretical concepts which help explain 
certain features, but it can be argued that it is hard to see what a concept like the 
“technological paradigm” of Giovanni Dosi, can do of good in order for people to understand 
technology and the way it changes, as the concept itself appear to be founded on a definition 
of technology which i) is impressionistic, and ii) cannot be said to reflect the nature of 
technological activity, or rather, engineering. And as Dosi does not, in a convincing and 
understandable way, account for what a “technological paradigm” really is, it can be argued 
that it is a vague theoretical notion based on a defective understanding of technology. A likely 
conclusion to draw from this might be that the “technological paradigm”-concept as presented 
in Giovanni Dosi’s paper “Technological paradigms and technological trajectories”, is not 
                                                                                                                                                         
89 Dosi paper, 3), page 152, 1st column lines 15-20, 
90 Stanley Metcalfe et al. 10), page 33, lines 4-7, 
91 Dosi paper, 3), p.151 2nd column lines 17 to 23, 
92 Dosi paper, 3), page 147, In section 2 of the paper Dosi try to show that the demand-pull theories of technical 
change presents a rather crude conception of technological change based on a “black box” of readily available 
technological possibilities. 
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consistent nor coherent, and is unfortunate to use as the foundation when endeavouring 
elucidate another theoretical conception.  
5.2.3   Kondratieff wave concept 
5.2.3.1   The “long wave”  
                                                
A certain group of researchers dealing with innovation theory and economic growth tend to 
maintain that economic growth historically has oscillated showing upswings and downswings 
identical to the shape of a wave. Ostensibly business cycles with varying frequency domains 
can be extrapolated from historical data, but in this dissertation focus will be kept on the wave 
phenomenon which often is referred to as the “long wave”. The “long wave”-concept as 
presented to us, stems from the work Nikolai Dimitrievitch Kondratieff performed concerning 
long term fluctuations in price and monetary data93. His research methodology endeavoured to 
isolate a long-term growth trend and then identify variations in the data around this trend94. 
According to Rainer Metz a “trend” is “the sum of components of which the duration exceeds 
65 years” and a “long wave” the sum of components ranging between 12 and 65 years95. To 
Carlota Perez, however, a “long wave” in economic growth is a wave described to consist of 
20 to 30 years of strong growth, succeeded by 20 to 30 years of unstable, uneven and slow 
growth with recessions and occasionally depressions96. She also maintains that the “long 
wave” consists of  four phases: the recovery phase when investments, profit rates and 
productivity growth are high, the prosperity phase characterised by exceptionally high growth 
 
93 Keith Smith & Tine Bruland, Large-scale technological transitions in history and theory, preliminary draft, 
ref.19), cited with authors permission,  page 2, lines 21 & 22, 
94 Smith & Bruland, 19), page 2, 
95 Francisco Louca & Jan Reijnders, The Foundations of Long Wave Theory, ref.9), Volume I, page xviii, lines 
12 to 19, 
96 Perez, 15), p.5, bottom section, 
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rates, the recession phase where a new investment pattern cause counter-trends in most 
markets, and finally the depression phase which speaks for itself97.  
 
Joseph A. Schumpeter, who based his “long-wave” models on the work of Nikolai 
Kondratieff, is held to be the father of the well-founded assertion that innovation is a driving 
force in economic growth98. Kondratieff, on the other hand, all though he saw the invention as 
a key factor in the shaping of the wave: the inventive activity increased during the recession 
and the inventions were applied during the successive period of growth, did not ascribe the 
driving of the wave to the invention, but rather attributed the generation of the upswing to 
acceleration of investments99. Unfortunately for Kondratieff’s theory it is widely accepted that 
the economic growth in Britain in the late eighteenth century cannot be accounted for by 
increased capital formation alone100. In his famous book Business Cycles, Schumpeter 
introduced the working hypothesis that innovation drives wave phenomena, by maintaining 
that profits gained by the innovators encouraged swarms of imitators, who in turn contributed 
to improvements of the original innovations until profits were eroded away due to 
competition. It was not the individual innovations which were important, but clusters of new 
and interrelated technical and social innovations which added up to a “technological 
revolution”, which in turn drove economic development and hence “the long wave”101. 
Apparently Schumpeter did not succeed in providing evidence for “any statistical link to the 
growth process which would support his hypothesis”102. What Schumpeter seemingly did was 
                                                 
97 Carlota Perez, Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Long Waves, ref.16), page 107, 
98 Keith Smith & Tine Bruland, see reference 19) page 1 to 3, 
99 Smith&Bruland, ref.19) page 3, top section, 
100 Smith&Bruland, ref.19) page 3, mid section, 
101 Perez ref.15) p5, Perez & Freeman ref.6) page 6&7, 
102 Smith&Bruland, ref 19) page 6, lines 10 to 11, 
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not to offer a theory of the generation of innovation, but rather accept as empirical facts 
that103:  
 
i) “innovations do not remain isolated events” but tend to be clustered together in time104,  
ii) innovations “tend to concentrate on certain sectors and their surroundings” 105and  
iii) “Industrial change is never harmonious ...at any given time, some industries move on, 
others stay behind106.  
 
Schumpeter did in his book express doubts concerning the correctness of his hypothesis107, 
but his followers do not seem to be haunted by his careful qualification. According to 
Christopher Freeman and Carlota Perez the Schumpeterian working hypothesis is “an 
essential part of Schumpeterian and neo-Schumpeterian analysis”108, and it can be argued that 
Schumpeter’s followers have done as Schumpeter himself suggested, namely espoused as the 
point of their departure that the hypothesis will work well109, and hence simply adopted the 
assumption that technology drives productivity growth110.  
5.2.3.2   Consistency in wave theory 
                                                
When evaluating the consistency of the “long wave” theory, the main concern is devoted to 
the aspect: Do the Kondratieff waves really exist? As an answer to this Christopher Freeman 
asserts the existence of five successive “long waves” with reference to Kondratieff and 
Schumpeter, see table 4.1, which all rests on specific “carrier” technologies, but it is not the 
single technologies which propel the oscillations, it is “a pervasive change of the 
 
103 Smith&Bruland, ref 19) page 4, lines 12 to 19, 
104 Business Cycles, ref. 18) page 75, lines 16 to 18, 
105 Business Cycles, ref. 18) page 75, lines 21&22, 
106 Business Cycles, ref. 18) page 76, lines 10 to 14, Smith&Bruland ref.19) page 4, lines 16 to 19, 
107 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles ref. 18), page 115, lines 19 to 27, 
108 Freeman&Perez, ref. 6) page 6, lines 3&4, 
109 Business Cycles, ref. 18) page 115, lines 28 to 34, 
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‘technological paradigm’”111. However, Freeman does not elucidate in detail exactly how 
these technologies emerge or how the change of “technological paradigm” can drive “the 
wave”, nor does he provide empirical evidence accounting for the apparent economic 
relationship between the emergence of the “carrier” technologies, the change of 
“technological paradigm” and the  growth rates achieved112. Solomos Solomou, as opposed to 
Freeman, allege that there exist no evidence concerning the Kondratieff wave phasing, when 
talking about long cycle in output, neither for the world in its entirety nor for individual 
economies113. Ostensibly it can be concluded that there is no general agreement among 
researchers concerning the existence of the Kondratieff “wave phasing”, and lack of empirical 
evidence in economic literature114 on the existence of the Kondratieff “waves”, imply that it 
can be argued that the existence of the “long waves” still is a matter of faith.  
5.2.4   “Techno-economic paradigm”, description 
The “techno- economic paradigm”, here after referred to as “TEP”, is by Carlota Perez 
defined to be “a new set of “best practice” principles that accompanies the diffusion of each 
technological revolution”115. She also allege that “a techno-economic paradigm is like the 
syntax of a language. It sets the rules for how you can transmit ideas effectively, but it does 
not change the ideas themselves”116. Hence, a “techno-economic paradigm” shift “is like a 
change of language, it is difficult to learn and as malleable to use as any new language is”117. 
As explained earlier, the change of “techno-economic paradigms” is related to the four phases 
of the “long wave” in a very specific way: In the recovery phase “favourable social and 
institutional conditions have been put in place to foster the generalisation of the previously 
                                                                                                                                                         
110 Smith&Bruland, ref 19) page 6 line 35, 
111 Louca, Francisco & Reijnders, Jan ref. 9) page xxii, lines 32&33, 
112 Smith & Bruland, 19), page 7, 
113 Smith & Bruland, 19), page 7&8, 
114 Smith & Bruland, 19) page 7,  
115 Perez, ref.15) page 6, lines 1&2, 
116 Perez, ref.15) page 11, lines 30 to 31, 
117 Perez, ref.15) page 11, lines 31 to 33,  
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crystallised techno-economic paradigm”118, something which is illuminated by high 
investments, profit rates and productivity growth. The succeeding period of  prosperity is 
characterised by extremely high growth rates “resulting from the combination of the final 
optimisation and maximum potential yield of the established, and by then, thoroughly 
generalised paradigm, and the first successful application of the future paradigm”119. During 
the recession phase the now “old” paradigm declines, and “the first signs of difficulty for 
further development of the “new” paradigm are encountered” , indicated by a new investment 
pattern causing counter-trends in most markets120. The depression phase is characterised by a 
“worsening mismatch.. between the techno-economic sphere (of the new tep...),.., and the 
socio-institutional  framework, which was shaped by the characteristics of the previous 
paradigm”121. It is ostensibly the successive “technological revolutions” originally derived 
from Schumpeter which is held responsible for the long range fluctuations in economic 
development, and hence the shifts in “techno-economic paradigms”122, where the 
“technological revolution”, is a “radical technology system” which “have universal impact by 
providing a quantum jump in productivity and a new dynamic potential for wealth creation 
that affects every economic activity”123. The question which then arises is how exactly does it 
provide “a quantum jump in productivity” and affect “every economic activity”? Both Perez 
and Freeman is very vague on this point, they willingly describe the impact of the 
“technological revolution” and talk about its diffusion accompanied by a “TEP”, but they do 
not give any plausible explanation on the causal connection between the “technological 
revolution”, increasing productivity and economic growth124.  
                                                 
118 Perez, ref. 16) page 107, lines 19 to 21, 
119 Perez, ref. 16) page 107, lines 25 to 28,  
120 Perez, ref. 16) page 106, lines 33 to 38,  
121 Perez, ref.15) page 6, lines 17 to 20, 
122 Perez, ref.15) page 6,  
123 Perez, ref.15) page 5, line 40, 
124 Smith&Bruland, 19), pages 6 &7 
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5.2.5   Coherence of “the techno-economic paradigm”-concept 
It can be argued that it is very difficult, by studying the publications made by Perez and 
Freeman, to get a clear concrete picture of what a “techno-economic paradigm” actually is. 
Perez, for example, allege, in the same paper, that 1) a “TEP” is nothing but a syntax of a 
language or a set of “best practise” principles without the ability and the power to “transform 
the economy”, and 2) a “TEP” has the power to transform “every branch of the economy and 
the economy of every country....and gradually modifying the ways of producing and the ways 
of living across the planet”125. When Perez both argues that a “TEP” has the power to 
transform the economy and that “TEPs” cannot change the ideas themselves, it gets quite 
confusing. If one readily accepts that a “TEP” is a set of “best practise” principles, it is hard to 
accept that it also has immense transforming power, and it can be argued that Perez’ 
description of the “TEP”-concept is leaving parts of the interpretation of the notion to the 
reader. Additionally a massive critique can be directed towards the “techno-economic 
paradigm”-concept, amongst others that there are i) many chronological problems, ii) no 
evidence offered of technological use, iii) no evidence on economic impact of the 
technologies in question, and finally iv) methodological problems126. The “TEP”-concept is 
very technologically deterministic, ascribing the alleged oscillations of economic growth, and 
hence the emergence of the “techno-economic paradigms”, to a very narrow range of 
technologies, even though most historians now agree that incremental changes in a wide range 
of industries have to be taken into account when explaining the characteristics of economic 
growth127. 
 
These issues will not be elucidated further, in this thesis, the main concern when investigating 
the consistency of the “TEP”-concept, is to discuss the components on which it is built: the 
                                                 
125 Perez, ref.15) page 6, lines 2 to 5, 
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“long wave”-concept and the “technological paradigm”-concept. As a means of 
accomplishing this objective, the conclusion suggested is that the “techno-economic 
paradigm”-concept is not coherent nor consistent, as it can be argued that: 
i) the “technological paradigm”-concept of Giovanni Dosi as presented in his paper 
“Technological paradigms and technological trajectories”, is a vague theoretical notion 
based on a defective understanding of technology, and hence, and is unfortunate to use 
as the foundation when endeavouring to elucidate another theoretical conception. This 
can be maintained, because Dosi does not in a convincing and understandable way, 
account for what a “technological paradigm” really is, nor does he provide a plausible 
explanation for why a “technological paradigm” can be defined in analogy to the 
“scientific paradigm” of Thomas Kuhn.  
ii) the existence of the  “long wave phenomenon” can be said to be a matter of faith. This 
is given as there is no general agreement among researchers concerning the existence of 
the Kondratieff “wave phasing”, and as there allegedly is a lack of empirical evidence 
in economic literature supporting the existence of  the “long wave”.   
                                                                                                                                                         
126 Smith & Bruland, 19), page 7, 
127 Smith & Bruland, 19), page 12,  
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5.3  Comparison between the theoretical foundation of 
NIFO and the “TEP”-concept  
5.3.1   Introduction 
The conceptual framework from which NIFO maintains to build its world view, is, as 
mentioned earlier, apparently drawn from evolutionary economy, with special reference to the 
“techno-economic paradigm”-concept of Carlota Perez and Christopher Freeman. According 
to Erik S. Reinert128, who is responsible for the theoretical foundation of NIFO, NIFO’s 
interpretation of the ”techno-economic paradigm”- concept is accounted for in his paper “Det 
tekno-økonomiske paradigmeskiftet – konsekvenser for næringspolitikken”. In his paper he 
presents a short version of Freeman and Soete’s table129, outlining the five successive “TEPs”, 
the important industries, the cheap resources and the infrastructure central to each paradigm, 
and it can be argued that despite the fact that both biotechnology and information technology 
(IT) are listed as key industries in the present paradigm, it is only the IT-industry which is 
emphasised in NIFO’s publications. However, NIFO does not elucidate why IT-investments 
are so important for Norway, what sort of IT investments which ought to take place, and what 
the key areas of growth in IT really are. The only argument provided is that Norway have to 
stay close to the “paradigm carrying activities”130, which apparently investments in IT is a part 
of.  An interesting thing to note is that Reinert claims to be an evolutionary economist, and it 
can be suggested that an evolutionary approach should be based on the creation of variety and 
the selection from that variety by the environment131, and not on information technology as 
the one and only core technology. NIFO’s understanding of the ”techno-economic paradigm”- 
                                                 
128 Interview with Per Morten Vigtel,   
129 See table 4.1, and 17), page 3, 
130 Interview with Erik Reinert 
131 Environment could be the natural environment, the reproductive market pressure, etc., 
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concept as accounted for in Erik Reinert’s paper132, is allegedly identical to Carlota Perez 
definition of the notion133134.  
 
5.3.2   Misinterpretation of “TEP”-concept 
Erik Reinert maintains that “These large innovation waves (long waves) in the beginning of 
the 1980-ties was baptised techno-economic paradigm shifts by the researchers Carlota Perez 
and Christopher Freeman”135, something which he allegedly substantiate by presenting a short 
version of table 4.1, listing the five successive “TEPs” as five means to increase the living 
standards. He also states that “a techno-economic paradigm shift is one innovation so 
overwhelming as to transform the asset chains in nearly every sector”136, and that “the special 
with the techno-economic paradigm shift is that these large innovation waves also change the 
society not just the economy”137. It is obvious that Reinert use the notion “TEP” shift  more 
or less synonymous to the term innovation waves, something which is very opposing to the 
“TEP”-concept of Perez and Freeman. The shift in “techno-economic paradigms” is, as 
previously mentioned, related to the four phases of the “long waves” in a quite particular way, 
but the “long waves” are not identical to the “techno-economic paradigm” shifts. Reinert also 
ascribe the “TEP” shift and what he calls the innovation waves, the power “to transform the 
asset chains in nearly every sector”, and change the society. Here, however, it is unclear what 
Perez herself means, since she, as mentioned prior, on the one hand states that the new “TEP” 
is capable of transforming, and on the other maintains that it just is a set of “best practice 
                                                 
132 Reinert, 17),  
133 A claim made by Erik Reinert during interview, 
134 Reinert has intimated that NIFO and Perez are “quite close”, something which is substantiated by the fact that 
NIFO is financing some of Perez’ research in Venezuela, and that Perez has been the author of one of the NIFO 
publications, a paper named “The Social and Political Challenge of the present Paradigm Shift”134. In the 
foreword to this paper134, Erik Reinert describes Carlota Perez as an overwhelmingly clear-sighted person, who 
will pilot humanity safely through the turbulence of the present “techno-economic paradigm” shift and into a 
new “belle epoque”. 
135 Reinert, ref. 17), page 1, lines 9 to 11, my translation, 
136 Reinert, ref. 17), page 1, lines 13  to 14,  my translation, 
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principles”. Anyway, it is not the “TEP” shift Perez is giving the transforming capacity, it is 
the “TEP”, were as to Reinert it is the shift which has the immense power, not the paradigm 
itself. Further Reinert asserts that the theoretical relationship between the “techno-economic 
paradigms” and the “long waves” is, that the wave is just a metaphor for a fan of windows of 
opportunity, and that the technology driving the “techno-economic paradigm” creates a fan of 
windows of opportunity, which again is more or less identical to the “long wave”138. But 
according to Freeman and Perez, a single technology is not driving the “TEP”, and the “long 
wave” is a metaphor for economic growth curves.  
 
It can be argued that that the version of the “techno-economic paradigm” presented in Erik 
Reinert’s paper139, is not identical to that of Carlota Perez. When academics theories from 
social sciences are exploited in political games, it can be implied that the theories risk being 
adapted in accordance with the political interests with which they interact, in a process where 
the society is shaping science instead of the other way around.  
                                                                                                                                                         
137 Reinert, ref. 16), page 1, lines 19 to 21, my translation, 
138 Interview with Reinert, 
139 Reinert, 17), 
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5.4  NIFO’s arguments supporting IT Fornebu 
As mentioned earlier, the theoretical foundation of NIFO, and hence of IT Fornebu, is based 
on the “techno-economic paradigm”-concept of Freeman and Perez, apparently providing a 
rationale to invest in information technology, and one of the main arguments asserted by 
NIFO, for why Norway have to invest in IT and promote IT developing activities, is the 
emergence of the fifth “techno-economic paradigm”. But even if we accept the existence of 
the Kondratieff “waves”, and hence the fifth “techno-economic paradigm”, this does not 
necessarily provide a plausible reason why a highly developed country like Norway, one of 
the worlds leading countries concerning use of information-and communication technology 
(ICT) equipment, with governmental support should build, more or less from scratch, an ICT-
cluster in close proximity to the capital. The only explanation NIFO provides in order to 
account for this is that we need to “stay close” to the “paradigm carrying activities”, where 
information technology allegedly is one of the “paradigm carrying activities”140. What it 
denotes to “stay close” to the “paradigm carrying activities” is not explained further, but it is 
maintained that a country like Mongolia, as opposed to Norway, is not close to them, partly 
because the sheep in Mongolia are not equipped with global positioning141.  
 
It can be argued that Erik Reinert when writing about evolutionary economy on behalf of 
NIFO, spread some sort of “the day of Judgement prophecy” concerning the ostensible 
present “techno-economic paradigm” shift. According to Reinert we now confront a “TEP” 
shift with processes of change as thorough as when the industrialisation was introduced142, 
and because the height of fall is much larger when in a “TEP” shift, one has to pay careful 
                                                 
140 Interview with Reinert, 
141 global positioning denotes that the sheep is equipped with electronic transmitters, and the farmers can through 
satellite connection can know where the sheep is positioned, 
142 Reinert, ref. 17), page 2, lines 4 to 5, my translation rather open and free, 
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attention143. Apparently certain trains are leaving and if you miss them, you have lost, because 
your chances of catching up later, is more or less non-existent144. All this allegedly indicating 
that it is during the “TEP” shifts, countries, which were in the richest countries in the world in 
the previous “TEP”, risk making fatal mistakes causing them to lag behind in the next 
“TEP”145, hence it is also during “TEP” shifts a country can, by making major efforts, 
substantiate its possibilities to advance on the prosperity statistics.  
 
Another argument maintained by NIFO in order to promote IT Fornebu, is that IT Fornebu is 
“Schumpeter in practise”146, because  IT Fornebu ostensibly, like a node in network society, 
will help Norway increase the innovative activity by coupling research/education, business 
activity and active long term investors, especially the NIFO and IT Fornebu investors. The 
apparent reason why this makes IT Fornebu “Schumpeter in practise”, is because Schumpeter 
allegedly represents the significance of innovation, and the notion that capital is not 
productive until it is coupled to innovations147. Due to space limitations in this thesis this 
reasoning will not be further elucidated.  
 
NIFO is not only deriving its argumentation from its fundamental faith in information 
technology, apparently drawn from the evolutionary and Schumpeterian economic approach, 
but it also asserts the following reasoning in order to justify the establishment of an IT-, 
knowledge- and innovation centre at Fornebu: 
 
                                                 
143 Reinert, ref. 17), page 2, lines 15 to 19, my translation, 
144 Explained during interviews, 
145 Explained by Reinert during interviews, 
146 Reinert, interview and e-mail, 
147 Explained by Reinert during interview and e-mail 
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i) During the last 20 years Norway has experienced a strong reduction in traditional 
industry, and the Norwegian economy is far too dependent on oil production and other 
raw materials compared to other OECD countries148.  
ii) Norway is a high cost country, and in order for Norwegian business life to be 
competitive, future business establishments have to be in knowledge based activities.   
iii) OECD-numbers indicate that the Norwegian position in knowledge- and information 
industry is weak. 
 
These assertions, however, are not original to NIFO. Information technology has for several 
years been on the political agenda in Norway149, and the above mentioned arguments have for 
long been exploited in order to support the apprehension that investments in IT is the way to 
welfare and prosperity150. The necessity to invest in information technology is supported by 
most Norwegian politicians independent of political party, something which was illuminated 
by the fact that when the decision concerning the establishment of an IT- and knowledge 
centre at Fornebu was carried, all parties, except a small party on the left wing, voted for the 
establishment. When looking at IT-strategic plans made by different Norwegian governments 
during the last five years, phrases like “highly developed use of IT shall be one of the 
strongest competitive advantages for Norwegian business life” are frequent151, and it can be 
argued that the impression one gets when reading these documents, is that information 
                                                 
148 In OECD standards Norway has had a quite special economic and industrial development the last 30 years 
primarily due to the fact that large oil resources were found on the Norwegian continental shelf in the end of the 
1960-ties, and as Norway is a small country the income provided by the oil industry, which is denoted as a low 
technology raw material industry, despite the advanced technology exploited in order to produce oil and gas in 
the North Sea, is major. 
149 see ref. 23), 31), 32), 37), 40), 42), 
150 for example see ref. 23) Forord lines 33 to 35: “It is not an alternative to avoid using information technology. 
That would make Norway fall behind as an industry nation and would undermine our possibilities to ensure asset 
creation, employment and prosperity”, and ref. 37) page 9, Mulighetenes samfunn, first line: “The digital 
society will become a better society”. 
151 Næringsrettet IT-plan for perioden 1998-2001, ref.37), page.4 lines 35-36, 
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technology allegedly is the answer to all our future problems, no matter whether we are 
talking about health, education or trade and industry.  
 
When evaluating the originality of the argumentation provided by NIFO in order to promote 
IT Fornebu, it can be argued that NIFO is providing an, in Norwegian standards, novel 
argument when promoting IT Fornebu, as NIFO apparently is the first in Norway to advocate 
the “techno-economic paradigm”-concept and the emergence of the Information and 
communication Kondratieff, but it can be suggested, that this argument is not a very 
convincing one. 
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5.5   How important is the theoretical “rationale”? 
When investigating the importance of the theoretical “rationale” of NIFO there are especially 
two aspects that seem necessary to elucidate further, namely what the “theory” has denoted 
for 
 
i) the private investors offering financial support to the IT Fornebu project 
ii) the political process. 
 
5.5.1   The private investors   
As mentioned earlier, it was shipping director Fred. Olsen, who more or less gave life to the 
IT Fornebu project, by signalling to be willing to invest NOK500 million on behalf of a group 
of private investors. But IT Fornebu is not the first IT-, knowledge-and innovation centre 
Fred. Olsen as a long term investor is engaged in. He has earlier been involved in the 
development of a research park in Asia, and is presently, amongst others, one of the investors 
in an IT-and knowledge park in Ireland. It might be suggested that one of the reasons why 
Fred. Olsen is investing in these IT-and knowledge parks, is that he believes, and has done so 
for decades, that we are presently experiencing the fifth Kondratieff, which he calls “the first 
brain revolution”, where machines are substituting brain power, something which in turn will 
enable us utilise the “muscle power substituting machines” better. Further he maintains that 
every century has two “long waves”, which are connected to something in the nature, and that 
the present wave, the fifth Kondratieff, will peak sometime around 2015.  
 
As mentioned above, it is likely to believe that the “long wave theory” has been of importance 
for the realisation of the IT Fornebu project, but as Fred. Olsen has been engaged in the “long 
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wave” phenomenon at least since the beginning of the 1980-ties, NIFO cannot have 
contributed to his belief in the “long waves”. A more plausible explanation is that Fred. Olsen 
has contributed to the creation of the theoretical foundation of NIFO, amongst others through 
the long standing personal relationship with Per Morten Vigtel, but also because Fred. Olsen 
is an influential and powerful member of NIFO. However, it can be argued that Fred. Olsen 
would have invested in the IT Fornebu project, even if  NIFO was not founded “evolutionary 
and schumpeterian economic analysis”, as Fred. Olsen’s fundamental faith in “long wave” 
theory and the emergence of “the first brain revolution”, makes him certain that long term 
investments in IT-and knowledge developing activities eventually will pay off. 
  
5.5.2   The political process  
It is difficult to find empirical evidence on how much the theoretical “rationale” of NIFO has 
contributed to the establishment of IT Fornebu. All the politicians interviewed during the 
work with this dissertation, denied that the theoretical background of NIFO had been of any 
importance to the political process, and nearly none of the politicians had read the 
publications NIFO distributed, but despite this, notions from NIFO can be identified both in 
political documents and in debates at Stortinget152. Obviously some of the aspects concerning 
the apparent theoretical foundation of IT Fornebu have entered their subconscious, even 
though their knowledge of evolutionary economics can be described as more or less non-
existent153. In a governmental report concerning IT policy published in January 1996, the first 
chapter begins with the sentences: “Information technology is a source of power which will 
change our every day life and our society as thorough as the industrial revolution once did. In 
reality we are living in the middle of this revolution”, the report also clearly states that “Our 
                                                 
152 Newspaper article, DN ajour, see ref.50), and citations from LO representative concerning “mismatch”,  
ref.54), 
153 Questions concerning evolutionary economy was asked during the interviews with politicians 
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prosperity will ..[depend on].. our ability to exploit information technology..”154. This report 
was made in 1995, and given that NIFO was founded in 1994 and that Erik S. Reinert started 
to work for NIFO 1995, it is not likely that Reinert’s ideas, and hence NIFO, can be held 
responsible for this governmental belief in the revolutionary power of information technology. 
At this point in time the Government in office was constituted by the Labour Party, at the time 
the largest political party in the national assembly, and of course it is possible that NIFO 
chose to adapt to the stand of the Labour Party, Ap, because this perhaps would grant NIFO 
better working conditions in political matters. However, the extremely good co-operative tone 
between NIFO and Ap during the whole period the IT Fornebu project has been treated is 
Stortinget, could imply that NIFO did not adapt to the stand of Ap, but rather that the two 
organisations separately had evolved a fundamental faith in IT as a transforming and 
revolutionary power, which officiated as a bonding factor between them. This line of 
argumentation is supported by Per Morten Vigtel, who maintains that the IT-revolution, or the 
“techno-economic paradigm” shift, enables new political alliances and creates a foundation 
for new political solutions. How much this common belief in IT has mattered to IT Fornebu, 
is hard to find empirical evidence on, but after Stortinget had decided to establish an IT- and 
knowledge centre at Fornebu, and it was obvious that IT Fornebu would get competition, what 
mattered was the political alliances NIFO managed to establish, and in that situation it was 
vital that Ap already advocated IT Fornebu.  
                                                 
154 Den norske IT-veien. Bit for bit, 23), page 4 & 5, 
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6 The political struggle in the parliament  
                                                
6.1  The decision in Stortinget 
The political struggle in parliament might be said to have started before most politicians 
dealing with the Fornebu project at a later stage, were aware that IT Fornebu was conceived at 
all155. As was explained in chapter 3, Jon Holt, in 1996, sent a letter to the Minister of Trade 
and Industry suggesting the establishment of an ICT-centre at Fornebu, and the ignorance of 
this letter may represent the first stoke in the political battle over Fornebu, even though it 
might be said to have been an ambush. During the first half of the 1990-ties Fornebu after-use 
was treated several times in Stortinget, but it was not until March 1997 that the IT-and 
knowledge centre for the first time was mentioned in a political document. In the long term 
programme 1998-2000156 the Government referred to the creation of an information-and 
communication technological centre at Fornebu as an agent to strengthen other IT-milieus in 
Norway. The Government therefore stressed that considerations for the development of such a 
centre should be taken, in the employment of the state-owned property at Fornebu. At this 
point in time the Government in office was constituted by the Norwegian Labour Party, Ap, 
already then strongly in favour of ITF. Here it is to be said that at that time ITF was the only 
candidate for developing Fornebu, and was looked upon both by the press and by politicians 
as more or less the incarnation of the IT-and knowledge centre at Fornebu. 
 
In September the same year the 4th-annual election for parliament was due, and when the 
votes had been counted the result revealed a change in the political climate. The election had 
been a disappointment for the Norwegian Labour Party, Ap, and despite the fact that Ap still 
 
155 The politicians I interviewed was not aware of the IT Fornebu project before it was a case in Stortinget late 
1997, 
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was the largest political party in the national assembly, they did not want to form a new 
Government. Due to this three smaller parties positioned around the political centre; Venstre 
(V), Kristelig Folkeparti (Krf) and Senterpartiet (Sp), formed a Government with only 42 of 
the 165 representatives in the Norwegian Parliament. With the new Government, Bondevik-
regjeringen, the working conditions for NIFO in promoting IT Fornebu changed radically, 
very well illustrated by the newly nominated Minister of Trade and Industry, Lars Sponheim, 
who, the day after the constitution, announced in the press that he would not give “a single 
crone” to the IT-establishment at Fornebu157. 
 
Despite this, later that year, December 11th to be exact, it was carried by all political parties 
except the left wing, Sosialistisk Venstreparti, SV, that a national IT-and knowledge centre 
should be developed at Fornebu. The decision about the IT-and knowledge centre was made 
as a part of the report on the state budget for 1998, made by the family-, culture- and 
administration committee158, where the majority of the committee supported the plans 
concerning the establishment of a national IT-and knowledge centre at Fornebu in order to 
“create an internationally attractive centre, which would contribute to new business activities 
and new educational functions in an interplay between research, education and business”159. It 
was also carried that the Norwegian state actively should participate in the realisation of the 
vision at Fornebu, by among others to get involved in the formation of long term relationships 
and joint companies with private investors.  
6.2  Fremskrittspartiet’s change of stand 
During the debate previous to the decision, several announcements were made by the different 
political parties in Stortinget, in order to state their intentions in the matter concerning the 
                                                                                                                                                         
156 Long term programme, St.mld.nr,4,, ref.41), page14, lines 43 to 56, 
157 See ref.49), 
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establishment of an IT-and knowledge centre. Ap160 very generously showed its compassion 
for IT Fornebu, by claiming that NIFO’s intentions in this matter, if realised, would create an 
establishment at Fornebu that would serve the whole country161. As would be expected both 
right wing parties, Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party), Frp, and Høyre (Right), made a joint 
statement announcing that they underlined that the participation of the State should be 
restricted to sale of state-owned property on regular business conditions, and that they did not 
want the State to get involved in formation of companies with private investors162. However, 
Frp was not going to support Høyre in its fight for no governmental participation in the IT- 
and knowledge centre for long. Some time during the spring of 1998, Frp made a strategic 
move from the stand they together with Høyre had published on December 11’th 1997, and 
towards the stand of the Labour Party, Ap. This resulted the quite absurd situation that Frp 
and Ap in co-operation, constituted the majority in Stortinget, dictating partial governmental 
participation in the company which should develop the IT-and knowledge centre at Fornebu. 
Apparently an ultra right neo-liberal anti-immigration party163 originally working for “strong 
reduction of income taxes, taxes and governmental restraints”164, promoted governmental 
participation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
158 B.innst.2 (1997-98), ref. 21), section 1.2.23, kap.5446 Sale of property, Fornebu, page 30, 
159 B.innst.2 (1997-98), see ref.21), page 30, lines 35 to37, my translation, 
160 Det norske Arbeiderparti, Ap, was founded August 22nd 1887, with universal suffrage as the major point on 
the political agenda. Ap, which historically has been a traditional socialistic party, has since 1927, been the 
largest political party in the national assembly. Through the years Det norske Arbeiderparti has, as would be 
expected, been the most dominant political party in Norway, very well demonstrated by the fact that if history 
starts around 1935, it is only about 14 years where Ap have not been in Governmental position, Aschehoug og 
Gyldendal, ref. 2) page 371, key word: norske Arbeiderparti,  
161 Debate Dec.11th concerning B.innst.2 (1997-98), ref.21), statement made by Gunnar Breimo, Ap, 
162 B.innst.2 (1997-98), ref. 21), page 31, 
163 Fremskrittspartiet was founded April 8th, 1973, in order to be a political party working for “strong reduction 
of income taxes, taxes and governmental restraints”163. The party was inspired by the Danish Progress party 
(Fremskridtspartiet), and was from the start the most right oriented political party in Norway. In 1994 internal 
fight resulted in the most “liberal” wing leaving the party, leaving Frp with an even more pronounced “right” 
profile. Frp has experienced varying election results during the years, from being a small protest party holding 
only 1,4% of the votes in 1975, to becoming the second largest political party in the national assembly in 1997, 
holding 25 of the 165 representatives.  
164 Aschehoug og Gyldendal, see ref.2), page 523, second column, key word: Fremskrittspartiet, lines 3&4, 
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As a result of Frp changing its mind concerning the IT- and knowledge centre at Fornebu, Frp 
in May 1998, stated that in its opinion the whole central area at Fornebu should be used for 
developing the IT Fornebu project. The reason why a political party constituted with the 
objective to reduce governmental restraints,  changed its mind and supported the 
establishment of a partially governmentally financed IT-and knowledge centre at Fornebu, is 
not totally clear. It has been claimed that Frp with the help of NIFO, had realised the 
tremendous amount of governmental funding involved in the development of the IT-industry 
in the USA, and as Frp ostensibly is a pragmatic “techno-nationalistic”165 party, it apparently 
was willing to accept governmental participation at Fornebu, in order to contribute to the 
Norwegian nation building. The Parliamentary spokesperson chosen by Frp in the IT- and 
knowledge centre matter, is very nationalistic and against immigration and belongs to the ultra 
right wing of Frp, but apparently the IT Fornebu project is very in line with his basic view. 
Another thing which might have contributed to Frp changing stand, is that it allegedly had 
been clear for some time that Høyre had become more ideological and in some political issues 
had moved further towards the right wing, and hence it was free space for Frp on the left hand 
side of Høyre, and the IT-and knowledge centre matter should, on that behalf, have been a 
good case to out-manoeuvre Høyre and make a tactical jump to the left. This in turn might 
increase Frp’s possibilities for getting into a Governmental position, as a political position 
partially to the left of Høyre would make Frp seem more credible both for the constituents and 
possible political partners.  
6.3  Political alliances 
The fact that Ap promoted the establishment of an IT-and knowledge centre at Fornebu, 
hardly surprised anyone, but the strong support the party at an early stage gave Norsk 
                                                 
165 Techno-nationalistic here denoting that Frp wants Norway to be a world leader  in amongst others ICT and 
other prestigious technologies, and as other Nordic countries have been successful in establishing ICT-clusters, 
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Investorforum’s baby, IT Fornebu, was not a part of its official political agenda. To some 
people, the fact that shipping director Fred. Olsen appeared as one of the guardians of IT 
Fornebu, were the key to the answer why Ap chose to support NIFO in its promotion of IT 
Fornebu. The link between Fred. Olsen and the Labour Party can be traced all the way back to 
the second world war166, but the most important period of interaction between Fred. Olsen and 
Ap, however, was during the trade depression in the shipping industry in the late 1970-ties 
and the early 1980-ties. Fred. Olsen was then a major owner and the leader of the chair of 
Akergruppen, primarily a group of shipyard companies, which at the time was the largest 
industry concern in Norway167. Akergruppen  ran into big financial problems as a result of the 
depression, and in order to avoid bankruptcy, the Norwegian government put large amounts of 
money into Akergruppen in order to get it out of the crisis. During the restructuring of 
Akergruppen from being a shipping concern to becoming a giant company supplying the 
offshore petroleum industry, a close co-operation evolved between Fred. Olsen, who 
represented the management of Akergruppen, the management in the trade union in 
Akergruppen and the Labour Party, from which the Government was constituted168. There is 
traditionally a close interaction between LO169, the largest trade union in Norway, and the 
Labour Party, something which, as long as a fruitful relationship existed between Fred. Olsen 
and the union in Akergruppen170, would contribute to strengthening the ties between Fred. 
Olsen and the Labour Party. The significance of the historical link between Fred. Olsen and 
Ap should not be overestimated, however, as it can be suggested that the main reason why Ap 
at an early stage rendered strong support to the establishment of IT Fornebu, might, as 
                                                                                                                                                         
Nokia, Ericsson, Oulo, etc. Hedstrøm maintained that it was necessary that Norway also developed an ICT-
cluster, interview with Hedstrøm, 
166 According to Fred. Olsen he went to school in the USA with Ap politicians during World War II, 
167 Nerheim, Norsk Olje Historie, ref.11), page 90 and 91, 
168 Interview with Fred. Olsen,  Kalheim, the union secretary in Aker at the time,  and Fred. Olsen’s had known 
each other since the 1950-ties, and were on friendly terms, 
169 The trade union in Akergruppen was a member of LO, 
170 Interview with Fred. Olsen,  Kalheim, the union secretary in Aker at the time,  and Fred. Olsen’s had known 
each other since the 1950-ties, and were on friendly terms, 
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mentioned earlier, have been a result of a shared basic view concerning fundamental issues 
between Fred. Olsen,  NIFO and Ap.  
 
However, Fred. Olsen is not the only actor, playing in the IT Fornebu game, with historical 
alliances in the Labour Party. Through the years, it has been a close connection between 
Telenor, as a gigantic state owned company, and Ap, as the Government in office representing 
the owner, and given Telenor’s major interests in IT Fornebu, it should not be forgotten that 
Tormod Hermansen, top manager of Telenor, is a member of Ap.  
 
6.4  Close co-operation 
As mentioned earlier, the majority in Stortinget in the IT- and knowledge centre matter, has 
been made up by the two strange bedfellows Ap and Frp. The representatives for the two 
parties have co-operated very close, in order to, through Stortinget, dictate the moves of the 
Government in the IT-and knowledge centre business. Ap and Frp, together, have dictated the 
Government in the IT-and knowledge centre matter, down to the level where they have told 
the Government to “as soon as possible or by June 1st 1999 decide the candidate chosen to 
develop Fornebu”171, and that “the registration building at Fornebu should be entered in the 
joint company”172. This type of detailed governance is quite unique in Norwegian history173, 
and Ap and Frp maintain that this was necessary, because the Government retarded the 
political process and did not follow the resolutions given by Stortinget. To illustrate this a 
spokesman for Ap explained that the Government in Report no.38 for Stortinget174  proposed 
that state-owned property at Fornebu should be sold on the open market. The majority in 
Stortinget responded negatively to this, because Frp and Ap did not think that this would 
                                                 
171 Innst.S.nr.99 (1998-99), pkt.1 i innstillingen,  see ref. 28), my translation 
172 Innst.S.nr.99 (1998-99), pkt.5 i innstillingen,  see ref. 28), my translation 
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ensure an IT-and knowledge centre at Fornebu, and that in accordance with prior motions 
carried in Stortinget certain presuppositions concerning education, regional interplay and 
incubator activity had to be put through when selling the property175. In the next document 
released from the Government concerning the IT-and knowledge centre, the Government 
maintained its position concerning selling the property, and as a result of this the majority in 
Stortinget carried a report which gave the Government detailed instructions on how to 
administer the IT-and knowledge centre project. 
 
But Ap and Frp did not only co-operate with each other in the IT-and knowledge centre 
business, they also worked close with Norsk Investorforum, NIFO. According to the press176, 
former employees of NIFO177 and several politicians178, NIFO’s arguments have been 
frequently used by Frp and Ap both in speeches and in documents prepared for Stortinget. 
NIFO is supposed to have helped Frp prepare its comments to the recommendation from the 
Industry Committee, were as Ap shall have used phrasing received on a fax from NIFO, in 
Ap’s marks to the Industry Committee179, and when confronted with this in the media a 
famous Ap politician claimed that when something is phrased in the best way possible there is 
no reason to change it just to change it180.  
6.5  IT project delay? 
It is claimed by the opposition that the way the Government operated in the Fornebu matter 
delayed the project, but the representatives from the Government disagree with this 
accusation. The Government maintain that in order to do a proper job, they at least had to 
                                                                                                                                                         
173 Newspaper article, see ref. 48) 
174 See ref. 42), page 36, second column,  top section, 
175 Interview with Torstein Rudihagen, Ap politician, 
176 See ref. 50), I lomma på Fred. Olsen, 
177 Interview with Gudmund Hernes, 
178 Interviews with politicians, 
179 See ref.50), I lomma på Fred. Olsen, 
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spend the time they did, and that the only way the period administrating the IT-centre business 
could have been shortened, was if the Government at an early stage had decided to let NIFO 
develop IT Fornebu.  However, they wanted to treat the whole business faire and square, and 
invite several tenders and give them time to come up with competing suggestions to IT 
Fornebu in order to get the best possible deal for the State at Fornebu. The Government also 
wanted to await the final regulation plan for the Fornebu area prepared by Bærum County 
Council before they made arrangements181. History show that this might have been a wise 
thing to do, because the regulation plan stated that no new entrepreneurial activities would be 
allowed at Fornebu before a motion, presenting a satisfactory solution concerning 
transportation on rails serving the Fornebu area, was carried in Stortinget. Whether what the 
Government did in this matter delayed the project is hard to say, but of course everything 
might have gone both smoother and quicker if a co-operative tone had existed between the 
Government and  Stortinget, something which was certainly not the case.   
                                                                                                                                                         
180 Radio interview with Kjell Opseth, Ap, no record, 
181 Interview with Hans Antonsen and Anita Apelthun Sæle, 
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7 The actors and the decision  
                                                
7.1  Inviting tenders 
In February 1999, Stortinget carried the motion that the government should participate as co-
owner in the company which was chosen to develop the IT-and knowledge centre at Fornebu, 
and that the Government could enter with both buildings and site, and that an appraisal in 
accordance with the EEA (European Economic Area)-regulations should be performed182. 
According to the EEA -agreement, Norway as a member is not allowed to give official 
economic support to business activity which might cause a twist in competition183. And 
because Stortinget had decided to actively support the vision at Fornebu, special care had to 
be taken in order to fulfil the obligations of the EEA membership. The EEA-regulations state 
as a rule of thumb that there is no unsuitable governmental support if the sale is performed by 
open bidding. If this cannot be attained an appraisal by independent appraisers have to be 
made in order to find the market prise for the property. The new Government, Bondevik-
regjeringen, ignored the decision in Stortinget concerning the EEA-appraisal, and chose 
instead to work out some general requirements and specifications for the development of the 
IT-and knowledge centre at Fornebu, in order to invite tenders.  
 
In order to work out these requirements and specifications the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
appointed an external committee, Spjøtvoll-utvalget184, which was commissioned to 
recommend in a report, which requirements and specifications the Government should employ 
when inviting tenders for the IT-and knowledge centre at Fornebu. The report should be 
worked out in a way securing most possible tenders to join the competition, and also make 
 
182 Innst.S.nr.99 (1998-99), see ref.28), 
183 Newspaper article, see ref. 47), Esa-godkjenning....., 
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feasible for new competitors to be able to work out a project proposal within six weeks. In 
addition the report also listed what the committee saw as the five most important selection 
criteria for the Government to employ when choosing the winner.  
 
Companies from all over Europe were invited to “bid”. What the “bidding” consisted of, was 
to deliver a project description of the centre the party wanted to develop at Fornebu, in 
accordance with the requirements Spjøtvoll-utvalget drew up. Within the closing date for 
entries, seven tenders had delivered project descriptions of differing qualities, from which 
three passed on to the second round. The three tenders the government entered negotiations 
with were IT Fornebu (ITF), Nettverk Fornebu (NF) and Technoport (Tp), where IT Fornebu 
was the project proposal delivered by Norsk Investorforum, Technoport a joint project 
proposal handed in by KLP Eiendom, which is an estate company, and Forskningsparken AS, 
which is the research park located at the University of Oslo, and Nettverk Fornebu was a 
proposal put together by three major Norwegian enterprises; Storebrand ASA, which is an 
insurance company, Orkla ASA, which is into chemicals, food, media, and finance among 
other things, and finally ICA AB/Haakon Gruppen AS, which primarily is a chain of grocery 
stores. 
 
In June, 1999, after the names on the three finalists were published, Technoport approached 
Nettverk Fornebu in order to establish some kind of co-operative relationship. Here it is 
important to note, that a merge between tenders was encouraged by the majority in the 
Industry Committee185. However, the negotiations with NF failed, leading Technoport 
towards  the other finalist IT Fornebu at the same game. IT Fornebu was more open to 
Technoport’s proposal, and the discussions lead up to a co-operative agreement, signed 
                                                                                                                                                         
184 Utvalg for utarbeidelse av krav og retningslinjer til et IT-og kunnskapssenter på Fornebu, ref.39), 
185 St.prp. nr.2 (1999-2000), ref.44), kap.1.2., 
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August 17th 1999, where IT Fornebu AS, IT Fornebu Eiendom AS, KLP Forsikring, KLP 
Eiendom AS and Forskningsparken AS agree to submit one joint tender186. The agreement 
regulates the reciprocal relationship between the five companies concerning the development 
of the IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre at Fornebu. The joint project was named IT 
Fornebu Technoport. Throughout the fall 1999, the Government negotiated separately with 
the two remaining tenders in order to get the best deal possible.  
7.2  The agreements 
By December 1999, the negotiations had lead to two quite different agreements both 
concerning the size of the IT-and knowledge centre, and the amount of governmental 
participation and control. The visions for both project proposals were as expected quite 
similar, and can in short to be said to state a wish to create an IT-and knowledge centre, where 
new business opportunities could flourish and grow through interplay between business life, 
research and education187. In addition an ambition to create an international attractive centre 
also including business incubator activity was clearly expressed. Another important issue was 
to make this centre a node for national development, both concerning internet-based education 
and regional development. During the negotiations and the compilations of both agreements, 
the cash emission assumed contributed in the joint company by the Norwegian State was set 
to NOK260 million. 
7.2.1   IT Fornebu Technoport 
The most important features in the agreement between the State and IT Fornebu Technoport, 
hereafter called IT Fornebu or ITF, described an IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre with a 
total need of 125 acres site, on which 390000m2 of functional buildings were to be developed. 
This area was split in three where 190000m2 were to be used for business purpose, 40000m2 
                                                 
186 Interview with Per Morten Vigtel, 
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for research, education and development, and the remaining 160000m2 were to be employed 
for apartments, schools, culture and sport. IT Fornebu’s organisational structure was described 
to consist of two companies; IT Fornebu AS and IT Fornebu Eiendom AS, where IT Fornebu 
AS was to be responsible for the management and development of the project vision, and IT 
Fornebu Eiendom AS for the estate and the operational part of the project. The governmental 
ownership was estimated to 33,4% in IT Fornebu AS and to 24,4% in IT Fornebu Eiendom 
AS. In this agreement the Norwegian State was reckoned as a normal share holder and got no 
preferential treatment188. 
7.2.2   Nettverk Fornebu 
In the agreement between the Norwegian State and Nettverk Fornebu, the site needed for 
developing the IT-and knowledge centre was estimated to approximately 78 acres, on which 
about 180000m2 of appropriate buildings would be altered or raised. Out of this 130000m2 of 
the building area was planned for business purposes, 25000m2 for research, development and 
education, and 25000m2 was reserved for apartments. Nettverk Fornebu AS was described to 
be the company responsible for the realisation of the project vision, the co-ordination of the 
activity in the centre, and for all estate and operational activity concerning the centre. The 
Norwegian State’s ownership in Nettverk Fornebu AS was estimated to 46,4%, and due to 
preferential treatment the State would get two representatives in the board down to a 15% 
ownership share and would in addition have full veto right down to a 25% ownership share 
and limited veto right down to a 15 % ownership share189.  
                                                                                                                                                         
187 See agreements between the State and the two tenders, ref. 25) and ref. 26), 
188 Information gathered from the agreement between ITFT and the State, ref. 25), 
189 Information gathered from the main agreement between Nettverk Fornebu and the State, ref. 26), 
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7.2.3   Main differences 
The main differences between the two candidates concerns the size and social structure of the 
centre, and the degree of governmental control. IT Fornebu wants to create a small IT-, 
knowledge- and innovation society, also including a social structure like movie theatre, sports 
centre, cafe’s and schools in order to both attract expert personnel and to encourage social 
interference outside working hours, as this is assumed important to promote innovation190. 
Spokesmen for ITF maintain that the size is important in order to create a world class centre, 
and that even a site of 125 acres might be too small. Where as Nettverk Fornebu claims that 
the IT-and knowledge centre itself does not need to include these social features in order to 
attract foreign experts and companies, and spokesmen for NF have expressed191 that other 
interested parties shall handle these functions. The difference in size is also reflected in the 
equity capital for the two projects, where the total stock in IT Fornebu Eiendom AS is 
estimated to NOK1000 million were as the corresponding value in Nettverk Fornebu AS is 
NOK590 million.  
 
The last and quite remarkable difference concerns the degree of governmental control. 
Nettverk Fornebu has offered the Norwegian state special treatment, were as the governmental 
ownership in IT Fornebu is a regular share holding ownership. According to IT Fornebu, the 
State will through a regular ownership get power and control, which reflect the competence 
the State possesses, and according to Per Morten Vigtel, the leader of the ITF secretariat192, if 
the State is given power which exceeds this it will be dangerous and damaging for the 
development of the project193. Nettverk Fornebu on the other hand is willing to give the 
                                                 
190 Interview with Per Morten Vigtel 
191 Said during åpen høring in Stortinget in February 2000, ref. 54), 
192 During the initial stage of the IT Fornebu project the secretariat in NIFO will function as secretariat for IT 
Fornebu, 
193 Interview with Per Morten Vigtel, 
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Norwegian State control beyond what traditionally has been the case in projects where the 
State has participated. Norway have a tradition for state-owned companies, where the State 
often is the majority owner, and hence have been controlling the development of these 
companies, with a few exceptions. How successful this have been for the society is a different 
story. Anyway, negotiators representing Nettverk Fornebu offered the Norwegian State as a 
minority owner more or less total control over Nettverk Fornebu AS, and hence, over the IT-
and knowledge centre at Fornebu, and this degree of governmental control is quite 
tremendous even in Norwegian standards.    
7.3  Siva, Selskapet for Industrivekst s.f. 
An important actor which entered the stage in the last year of the IT Fornebu process, was the 
Norwegian state-owned enterprise SIVA or Selskapet for industrivekst s.f.. SIVA was 
established in 1968 and is owned by the Ministry for Local Government and Regional Affairs, 
KRD. When SIVA was established, the overall aim was to be an agent in regional 
development primarily as an estate owner. This, however, has changed along with the political 
climate, and the modern SIVA of today has become a network building organisation with 
engagements all over Norway, including both estate- and business investments primarily in 
research-and knowledge parks, “business gardens”, “business incubators” and capital-and 
venture companies. 
 
Regional development has always been an important issue on the political agenda in Norway, 
and the IT-and knowledge centre at Fornebu has by no means been an exception to this. In the 
report prepared by Spjøtvoll-utvalget the tenders’ ability to raise venture capital in order to, 
among others, pursue regional development and their capability to create interplay between 
Fornebu and distant regions, were ranked respectively as number 4 and 5, on the priority list 
of criteria the government was to employ in the selection process. In Report no.13 for 
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Stortinget (1998-99)194 which was carried in November, 1998, the Government presupposed 
that these activities would be run in co-operation between private actors, and among others the 
governmental enterprise SIVA . SIVA’s role at Fornebu was described as i) an agent 
concerning ownership of the business incubator buildings, ii) an agent for strengthening 
regional centres of  IT- and competence, and iii) an agent to promote interplay between 
regional milieus and the centre at Fornebu195. 
 
With the resolution of Report no.13 for Stortinget in mind, the representatives for ITF in late 
January 1999, contacted SIVA in order to establish some kind of co-operative relationship. 
SIVA was a bit aloof at the time, awaiting further moves from the Government and its owner, 
the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, KRD196. When in April 1999, 
SIVA received a letter from KRD asking about SIVA’s stand concerning the IT- and 
knowledge centre at Fornebu, SIVA started to make plans and prepare its strategy. SIVA 
responded to the inquiry, among others by stating that SIVA was the natural agent to “execute 
the state ownership in the company which was to develop the IT- and knowledge centre at 
Fornebu”197. A couple of weeks later SIVA expressed this view in the press, and also 
discussed it with Lars Sponheim, Minister of Trade and Industry, who apparently responded 
positively at the time198. 
 
As a part of SIVA’s strategy in reaching the goal in becoming the governmental 
representative at Fornebu, SIVA in June 99, approached NF in order to sort out eventual 
possibilities for establishing a future intentional agreement, but NF was not interested. SIVA 
then turned to IT Fornebu, and a meeting was arranged in order to discuss regional efforts, 
                                                 
194 Stortingsmelding nr.13, (1998-99), kap.5, ref.43), 
195 Stortingsmelding nr. 13, (1998-99) kap.5, ref. 43), 
196 Interview with Siva Director Harald Kjelstad, 
197 letter from Siva to KRD, dated May 5th, 1999, ref.46),  front page lines 17&18, my translation, 
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and two months later, on December 10th, an agreement in principle was attained initiating the 
framing of an intentional agreement between SIVA and ITF. January 28th 2000, the 
intentional agreement between SIVA and ITF was signed by both parties and distributed to 
the SIVA board. By mid February the intentional agreement was approved both by the SIVA 
board and the board of ITF199.  
7.4  Final decision 
On December 17th, 1999, the Government published that Nettverk Fornebu was the candidate 
they found best qualified for developing the IT-and knowledge centre at Fornebu. The official 
reason for choosing NF was that the Government assumed that 78 acres would be sufficient in 
order to develop a professionally adequate IT-and knowledge centre, an assumption which 
also was supported by Spjøtvoll-utvalget. In addition the Government maintained that NF 
prioritised the development of the IT-centre itself, instead of focusing on creating an estate 
project. The fact that the Norwegian State would be given long term influence and control in 
the policy-creating process of the NF-concept, was assessed as be a major asset, and also the 
reduced economic risk connected to NF compared to ITF contributed to the Governmental 
choice200. As a response to the Government’s publishing of NF as the winner, the majority in 
Stortinget constituted by Fremskrittspartiet, Frp, and the Labour Party, Ap, announced a 
public inquiry in Stortinget concerning the IT-and knowledge centre. During the inquiry 
nothing new arose, and the reason why it was held, was, according to a spokesman for Ap, to 
enlighten the Norwegian citizens on the facts of the IT-and knowledge centre matter, because 
many accusations of “monkey business” was put forward during the political process201. The 
inquiry was held in the beginning of February, only a short time after the intentional 
agreement between SIVA and ITF had been officially known. The fact that SIVA had made 
                                                                                                                                                         
198 Interview with Harald Kjelstad, 
199 Interview with Harald Kjelstad, and a written list over events in the IT Fornebu matter made by Kjelstad, 
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this agreement annoyed the Government to a large extent, because it felt that SIVA had 
worked against it behind its back202. However, SIVA did no formal mistakes when they 
started negotiating the intentional agreement with ITF203, because the intentional agreement 
would no matter what, have to be approved by the SIVA board and the Minister of Local 
Government and Regional Affairs in order to be considered valid. In addition it is worth 
mentioning that the management in KRD, including the Minister, had been familiar with the 
strategy and actions of SIVA during this period.  
 
During the last year of the Fornebu process SIVA had been playing its cards right, concerning 
its wish to be the governmental agent at Fornebu, resulting in an adoption of this stand by the 
majority in Stortinget. When Stortinget was to vote on which of the duellists they found most 
suitable to develop the IT-and knowledge centre at Fornebu, the majority’s motion where IT 
Fornebu Technoport was promoted as the preferred candidate also treated SIVA’s role at 
Fornebu. The Government could not accept this and announced that if the proposition 
concerning SIVA’s role at Fornebu was maintained204, they would demand a vote of 
confidence. Ap and Frp then decided to withdraw the SIVA part of the proposition and rather 
invert it to a transmission motion. The vote that followed ascertained what had been known 
for quite some time: the victorious combatant of the Fornebu battle was IT Fornebu 
Technoport.  
                                                                                                                                                         
200 Announcement to the press 16.12.99, st. prp. 35 (1999-2000), ref. 38), 
201 Interview with Torstein Rudihagen, Ap, 
202 Interview with Hans Antonsen and Anita Apelthun Sæle, 
203 Aftenposten, March 8th  2000, page.3, Siva striden neppe over, ref.51), 
204 Announced in the press at the time, and confirmed by interviews, 
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8 IT Fornebu Technoport (ITFT): strategy and 
components  
                                                
8.1  Introduction 
The main agreement between IT Fornebu Technoport, ITFT, and the Norwegian State, here 
after called the Agreement205, outlines the roles the different actors behind IT Fornebu 
Technoport will have to play, concerning the IT-, knowledge and innovation centre at 
Fornebu. In the Agreement the Objective and the Vision of IT Fornebu Technoport, hereafter 
called IT Fornebu, ITF or ITFT, is clearly defined, but very little is said about how the 
Objective will be accomplished. In other words, it is quite clear what is expected of the IT-, 
knowledge- and innovation centre, but how this supposedly is to be done, is left for the 
companies responsible yet to work out. 
 
Even though the IT Fornebu project has developed and become more articulate, since the first 
description illuminated in the report Norsk Investorforum made on commission for Statsbygg 
in 1996, it is still quite unclear how the vision and the injunctions of the IT-, knowledge- and 
innovation centre are to be realised. The vision of creating the “most attractive IT-and 
knowledge centre in Europe by year 2005” is now substituted by the Vision of  “In an 
interplay between research, education and business life, in a long term perspective to create a 
knowledge milieu aimed at the future, and characterised by variety in order to increase 
creativity and knowledge based business development on a national level”206. In order to 
realise the Vision the following three part goals, referred to as the Objective, are defined:  
 
205 see ref. 25), agreement between Staten and ITFT, 
206 see ref.25), page 2, section 1.2.3, Visjonen,   
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i) To create an internationally attractive milieu for knowledge based business 
development and innovation in IT-and knowledge related activity, also by the use of 
incubator activity,  
ii) Establish an interplay between research and private venture capital, and to make 
necessary arrangements for those who attach parts of their activity to the centre, and   
iii) To arrange for the centre to become a main node in a national network for after- and 
further education, and to make Norway a leading country in Europe within research, 
development, and sale and use of products and services in electronic learning207.  
8.2 Organisation and components 
Two stock holding companies; IT Fornebu AS and IT Fornebu Eiendom AS, are responsible 
for the activities exercised by IT Fornebu Technoport, the IT-, knowledge- and innovation 
centre at Fornebu. IT Fornebu AS is responsible for developing and executing the Vision of 
the centre, were as IT Fornebu Eiendom AS is responsible for acquiring, developing and 
actually operating the estate part of the centre in accordance with the Vision208, see figure 7.1.  
                                                 
207 See ref. 25), page 2, section 1.3.3. Målet, my translation,  
208 Relationship described in the agreement between ITFT and the State, ref. 25), pages 3&4, 
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Figure 7.1 Organisational chart 1. 
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In order to formalise the collaboration between IT Fornebu AS and IT Fornebu Eiendom AS, 
a co-operational agreement framing the relationship between the companies, also concerning 
financial matters, have been made. The agreement is, among others, stating that in order to 
cover some of the expenses in connection with the realisation of the Vision and the Objective, 
IT Fornebu Eiendom AS shall, during a ten year period, transfer to IT Fornebu AS the amount 
of NOK180 million. If the building area acquired by IT Fornebu AS is smaller than the 
presupposed 390 000m2, the amount will be reduced. IT Fornebu Eiendom AS shall also 
transfer the amount of NOK40 million as a bonus given that the development of the idea and 
the accomplishment of the Vision is successful, presupposed, however, that IT Fornebu 
Eiendom AS successfully acquire a 125 acres at Fornebu. The bonus shall be used to develop 
IT Fornebu AS further and not be credited the share holders of IT Fornebu AS. In the 
agreement IT Fornebu AS is obligated to, through its work, directly or indirectly contribute to 
a satisfactory development of the assets of the properties of IT Fornebu Eiendom AS at 
Fornebu, by generally arranging for companies and institutions which effectively contributes 
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to making the IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre an attractive place to settle, and by 
realising the Vision and the Objective209. 
 
8.2.1   IT Fornebu AS 
IT Fornebu AS is a stock holding company with 15 share holders founded October 24th 1996, 
which after the capitalisation described in the Agreement holds a stock capital of 
approximately NOK32,3 million, where the State is the largest owner holding 33,4 % of the 
shares of the company, and the Norwegian phone company Telenor is the second largest 
owner holding 12,14% of the shares. An interesting feature concerning the ownership in IT 
Fornebu AS is that among the share holders several symbolic owners are to be found. The 
largest trade union in Norway, Landsorganisasjonen, LO, representing more than eight 
hundred thousand members, holds 0,04% of the shares, SINTEF, the largest private research 
institution in Norway, holds 0,14% of the shares and Handelshøyskolen BI, a private business 
school, also holds 0,14% 210. These shares might have been bought for several reasons, but it 
might be argued that the most likely explanation is that the shareholders want to make a 
political statement, and at the same time get access to first hand information concerning the 
IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre they assumed would be developed at Fornebu.  
 
The main responsibility of IT Fornebu AS, is to evolve and realise the Vision, and through a 
porter function arrange for and ascertain that all activities at the IT-, knowledge- and 
innovation centre are run in accordance with the framework of the Vision. According to the 
Agreement, IT Fornebu AS is also obligated to run investment activity both in connection 
with i) the business incubator at the IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre, and ii) other 
                                                 
209 Information found in the agreement between ITFT and the State, ref.25), pages 12&13,  
210 Information found in the agreement between ITFT and the State, ref.25), pages 7&8, my translation, 
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knowledge based activities211. Additionally IT Fornebu AS is given the task to develop a 
network of knowledge milieus both at a national and at an international level.  
 
In order to more thoroughly describe the duties of IT Fornebu AS, eleven tasks and functions 
which IT Fornebu AS will have to attend to, are described in the Agreement. The tasks are as 
follows212: 
 
1) IT Fornebu AS will attend to the Vision; among others by having the superior 
responsibility for the composition of and the arrangement for a flourishing knowledge 
milieu, 
2) IT Fornebu AS shall have the organisational responsibility for all activity in the IT-, 
knowledge- and innovation centre, including co-ordination of the contact between and 
joint activities for the independent institutions of the IT-, knowledge- and innovation 
centre, also called the general centre management, 
3) IT Fornebu AS shall co-ordinate the independent institutions within research and 
education in the areas where their activities are of concern for the activity of the IT-, 
knowledge- and innovation centre. In connection to this IT Fornebu AS shall administer 
and follow up the funds received from IT Fornebu Eiendom AS allocated to this purpose, 
4) IT Fornebu AS shall run incubator activity in order to arrange for several new enterprises 
– including administer the funds received from IT Fornebu Eiendom AS allocated to this 
purpose, 
5) IT Fornebu AS shall (in co-operation with the existing network of the business life-, 
research- and educational institutions) contribute to contact, coupling and  collaboration 
between business-, research- and educational institutions (including students). The 
                                                 
211 Ref.25), page 3 section 2.2 IT Fornebu AS 
212 Ref.25), pages 5&6, section 4.4.1 Generelt, points a to k, my translation, 
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objective for the activity of IT Fornebu AS concerning this area shall be to contribute to 
increased commercialisation of research results and enhanced entrepreneurial spirit, 
6) IT Fornebu AS will establish institutions for co-operation with research-and educational 
institutions; including a scientific council which will be given nominating authority for the 
IT Fornebu AS board concerning professional questions attached to research and 
education, 
7) IT Fornebu AS shall stimulate to close contact between students and business life among 
others by offering a system for imparting of dissertations and traineeship for students, by 
arranging for and permitting students, project related co-workers and others admission to 
perform relevant activities at the IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre, 
8) IT Fornebu AS shall (in addition to the marketing performed by the independent 
institutions at the IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre) have superior responsibility for 
the totality of the marketing of the IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre in best interest 
for the long term objective of the Vision. IT Fornebu AS shall administer and follow up 
funds allocated to this purpose,  
9) IT Fornebu AS shall (parallel to the international network of the independent institutions 
at the IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre) work for making the IT-, knowledge- and 
innovation centre internationally recognised as an attractive centre of  professional high 
quality, 
10) IT Fornebu AS shall work for making the function of the IT-, knowledge- and innovation 
centre positive for the regional knowledge milieus among others by arranging for 
collaboration between such milieus and the institutions at the IT-, knowledge- and 
innovation centre, and 
11) IT Fornebu AS shall have the responsibility for the operation, service-and support 
functions attached to the tasks describes under point 1) through 11) written above. 
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 In order to maintain these functions and tasks IT Fornebu AS will among others i) enter into 
agreements with the individual research- and educational institution established at or attached 
to the IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre, ii) establish and/or participate in such 
companies or enter into agreements with these concerning participation in the IT-, knowledge- 
and innovation centre and iii) organise, co-ordinate and participate in the daily operations of 
the IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre213.  
 
8.2.2   IT Fornebu Eiendom AS 
IT Fornebu Eiendom AS was founded May 7th 1997 with a stock capital of NOK14,96 
million. In year 2000 the stock capital of IT Fornebu Eiendom AS will be increased to NOK1 
billion, where the Norwegian State is going to contribute with approximately NOK250 
million and the remaining NOK750 million will be put in by the six remaining share 
holders214. After the emission the Norwegian State will be the largest share holder of IT 
Fornebu Eiendom AS, and the intention is that the State, within the premises given by 
Stortinget, in year 2001 (by first half) is going to participate together with the other share 
holders in an additional capital increase in IT Fornebu Eiendom AS, if this is necessary in 
order to fulfil the Vision, the Objective or other businesslike demands.  
 
The main responsibility of IT Fornebu Eiendom AS is, according to the Vision, to develop, 
operate and manage the property at Fornebu intended for the IT-, knowledge- and innovation 
centre215. Included in this is also the responsibility for the reconstruction of the existing 
buildings and the raising of new buildings necessary in order to realise the Vision and the 
                                                 
213 Ref.25), page 6, section 4.4.1 Generelt, lines 23 to 28, my translation, 
214 Ref.25), page 10, 
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Objective. Here the key numbers are to be found in the development plan for ITFT  
presupposing a site of 125 acres on which, according to the local regulation plan for the area, 
390000m2 of buildings can be raised, meaning that unless IT Fornebu Eiendom AS obtain at 
least a 125 acres site, the building area of the IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre will have 
to be reduced216.  
 
In order to make IT Fornebu Eiendom AS in possession of the necessary property 
presupposed in order to develop the IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre at Fornebu, in 
accordance with the Vision and the Objective, as described in the Agreement, a sales 
agreement between the Norwegian State and ITFT was made217. The sales agreement218 gives 
account for how IT Fornebu Eiendom AS will obtain the state-owned property at Fornebu, 
including both site and buildings. According to the sales agreement, IT Fornebu Eiendom AS 
will have to pay NOK634,6 million for the state-owned property at Fornebu, a prise estimated 
by an appraisal made in accordance with the EEA-regulations (see section 6.1) and subtracted 
a 5% prise reduction due to the IT-injunctions. In addition IT Fornebu Eiendom AS, as the 
buyer of the property, is responsible for covering costs, corresponding to NOK27 million at 
the time of the conveyance, connected with building transportation on rails serving the 
Fornebu area. Eight years after the signing of this sales agreement these obligations will no 
longer apply219.  
8.2.3   Co-operative partners 
KLP Forsikring, which is the second largest life insurance company in Norway, is obligated 
by the Agreement to establish an investment fund, IKT-fondet, face value NOK100 million, 
                                                                                                                                                         
215 Ref.25), page 9, section 5.1.1, 
216 Ref.25), page 9, section 5.1.2, 
217 Ref.25), pages 11&12, section 5.5.1, 
218 Kjøpsavtale mellom Staten og ITFT, see ref. 33), 
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for information-and knowledge technology. The fund shall invest with a shared risk profile in 
activities exploiting eventual advantages within information-and communication 
technology220. 
 
KLP Eiendom AS, which is one of the largest estate companies in Norway, primarily focusing 
on the Oslo area, is a daughter company of KLP Forsikring. When IT Fornebu Eiendom AS 
has received the property from the State, KLP Eiendom AS shall have an option to buy parts 
of the property, in accordance with an agreement between IT Fornebu AS, IT Fornebu 
Eiendom AS, KLP Eiendom AS and Forskningsparken AS221. This agreement which is named 
the KLP-agreement undertake KLP Eiendom AS to co-ordinate the utilisation of the property 
with IT Fornebu Eiendom AS in order to effectively secure an in entirety development of the 
IT-, knowledge-and innovation centre and attached areas in accordance with the Vision. See 
figure 7.2. 
 
Forskningsparken AS, which is a stock holding company with 40 shareholders where the 
University of Oslo, SIVA and Oslo County accounts for 71% of the shares of the company, 
has the objective to contribute to growth and value creation in Norway based on a healthy 
economic foundation and on research collaboration222. Forskningsparken AS is the company 
operating Forskningsparken, the research park located at the University of Oslo, where an 
important part of the operational activity constitutes running business incubator activity. In 
the co-operational agreement made by the parties behind ITFT in August 1999, 
Forskningsparken AS is committed to contribute to the development of the incubator activity 
at Fornebu in an entity manner. The parties have, after the signing of the above mentioned 
                                                                                                                                                         
219 Ref. 33), page 2&3, section 3, Kjøpesum og dekning av kostnader, 
220 Ref.25), page 14, section 9 Etablering av IKT-fond, 
221 Ref.25), page 13, section 8 KLP Eiendom AS, 
222 Ref.25), page 12, section 6 Forskningsparken AS, 
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agreement, agreed upon organising the incubator activity as an integrated part of the activity 
of IT Fornebu AS, if this however, appear to be impossible, a separate company, where 
Forskningsparken AS is entitled to acquire 50% of the shares, will be established in order to 
operate the incubator223. 
                                                 
223 Ref.25), page 13, section 6.2 & 6.3, 
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Figure 7.2 Organisational chart 2 
 
 
8.2.4   IT Fornebu Knowation AS 
IT Fornebu Knowation AS, here after called Knowation, was founded in December 1998 
under the name IT Fornebu Multimedia Læring AS, but in April 2000 the name was changed 
to IT Fornebu Knowation AS. Knowation is a stock holding company with 11 share holders, 
all of them also share holders in IT Fornebu AS, where IT Fornebu AS is the largest 
shareholder, holding 30% of the shares, closely followed by Telenor. The operation of the 
company has so far been financed by an emission of NOK15 million in 1999 and by a loan 
face value NOK14 million from some of the shareholders. During the spring of 2000, 
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Knowation called for an directed emission of between NOK30 and NOK150 million, resulting 
in actually receiving and emission of NOK57 million224.  
 
The purpose for the emission was to finance the vision of  becoming “one of the main 
suppliers of ICT- (information- and communication technology) based products and services 
for after- and further education”225. If Knowation has success in realisation the vision, the idea 
is that by doing so Knowation will contribute in evolving Norway to a highly developed 
knowledge nation, and the main tool in this process will be the establishment of interactive- 
and internet-attached centres of learning throughout the nation. In addition Knowation has the 
objective of in collaboration with co-operative partners to develop teaching programmes 
which combine the best elements from traditional learning with the technological 
infrastructure of the future, and  offer these through the centres of learning. 
  
During year 2000, a limited number of pilot projects will be established in order to gradually 
introduce Knowation’s products in the market. The first centres of learning will be established 
in different parts of Norway during second quarter of year 2000, and are estimated to be 
operative by the end of third quarter 2000. At present the plan is, by the end of December 
2000, to establish 30 centres of learning localised according to marketing needs. Further it is 
scheduled to develop an additional 20 educational centres by the end of 2001 and by the end 
of year 2002 to reach a total number of 62 centres of learning. Knowation also has 
international ambitions, and the first establishment outside Norway is estimated to take place 
within year 2001. The first educational offers will be in information technology, health- and 
social science, law and management and organisation, among others, and the institutions 
responsible for the educational content are Aktiv Opplæring, H. Aschehoug & Co, 
                                                 
224 http://www.knowation.com/presse1.html, 20.07.2000, kl:20:00, ref.64), 
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Handelshøyskolen BI, Høgskolen i Narvik, Høgskolen i Telemark, Juristenes 
utdanningssenter and TQM Center Norway, none of which is among the most prestigious 
educational institutions in Norway226. 
 
In the public enquiry in Stortinget prior to the final treatment of the IT-and knowledge centre 
at Fornebu, Knowation was used as an argument in order to demonstrate that IT Fornebu 
Technoport was a better candidate than Nettverk Fornebu concerning regional development. 
Establishing educational centres all over Norway, also in more distant areas, were expected to 
contribute to growth in these areas, and to prevent the IT- and knowledge centre at Fornebu 
from hoovering the countryside for qualified IT personnel. An important aspect here is of 
course that also without IT Fornebu (ITFT) as the winning candidate, Knowation would have 
pursued its goals and vision, contributing to the success of the IT-and knowledge centre at 
Fornebu227. Knowation is also involved in attracting foreign companies to Fornebu. So far an 
agreement between IT Fornebu AS and Oracle Norge AS have been made in order to develop 
multimedia-and net based education primarily in connection with Knowation. Another quite 
interesting feature about the purpose of Knowation is, according to Per Morten Vigtel, 
speaking on behalf of IT Fornebu, that Knowation’s effort concerning after- and further 
education is not an objective in itself, but an agent in order to create new business activity and 
to effectuate the public sector. Further he says that this is what have made IT Fornebu so 
controversial: both signalling a necessary process of change and fronting the contribution to 
the accomplishment of the process228.   
                                                                                                                                                         
225 my translation, http://www.knowation.com/presse2.html, 18.07.00, 12:00 hrs, ref.63), 
226 see ref.63) 18.07.00, 12:00 hrs, 
227 Interview with Per Morten Vigtel, 
228 http://www.knowation.com/presse1.html, 20.07.00, 20:00 hrs, ref.64) 
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8.3   Overall Strategy 
When Per Morten Vigtel, the present leader of the secretariat of IT Fornebu, is asked to draw 
up the lines for the overall strategy of the IT Fornebu project, he clearly states that the estate 
part of the project, the more easy and straight forward part, is not of great concern to him. He 
continues by saying that IT Fornebu is not a place but and idea, and that the strategy of the IT 
Fornebu project can be said to consist of three main areas, where the first it is to attract 
foreign companies in order for them to perform developing activities at Fornebu, the second 
area of importance is the regional dimension with the establishment of links and interaction 
between IT Fornebu and other national research parks, and the third is the promotion of 
creativity229. 
 
According to Per Morten Vigtel a lot have already been done concerning attracting foreign 
companies to establish developing activity at Fornebu. The plan is to attract foreign 
companies either in connection with Telenor or in connection with IT Fornebu Knowation 
AS. Some intentional agreements have been made and some are under negotiation, among 
others negotiations have been made between ITF, Telenor and Compaq, and as mentioned 
earlier, an agreement have been made between IT Fornebu AS and Oracle Norge AS in order 
to develop multimedia- and net based education. In addition collaboration is established with 
several foreign universities and research parks230. 
8.4   Regional dimension 
In order to promote regional development Stortinget231 has decided that the IT-and knowledge 
centre at Fornebu shall contribute to i) an interplay between research and innovation milieus 
nationally, ii) net-based education and iii) incubator activity. IT Fornebu AS has two major 
                                                 
229 Interview with Per Morten Vigtel, 
230 Interview with Per Morten Vigtel, 
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strategies in order to accomplish these objectives: first, the establishment of IT Fornebu 
Knowation AS will contribute to imparting net-based education to and between the different 
regions, secondly, by providing access for knowledge milieus throughout the nation to the 
network organisation, which is a part of IT Fornebu Incubator AS232. In addition IT Fornebu 
AS will support the suggestions concerning increased educational capacity in IT-sciences 
nationally, and the establishment of Norgesnett Junior233. By doing this IT Fornebu AS 
maintains to contribute to 1) improve regional development of competence, 2) facilitate the 
access to competent private venture capital, and 3) increase the access to counsellors and 
personnel with plenty of resources in order to promote entrepreneurial activity in the regions. 
It can be argued however that it is difficult to see how IT Fornebu AS’ two major strategies 
will contribute to point 1), 2) and 3), or to the injunctions given by Stortinget, something 
which the Government also pointed out when assessing the tender delivered by IT Fornebu234. 
 
Another important issue which might help fulfil the requirements concerning regional 
development, is the intentional agreement between IT Fornebu AS, ITF, and the state-owned 
enterprise SIVA235. The objective of this agreement is to, through NRI,  “attempt to combine 
visions, strategies, competence and capital in order to develop robust regional systems of 
innovation, focusing on knowledge based creativity in an internationally oriented market 
perspective”236. NRI denotes Norsk Regional Innovasjon (Norwegian Regional Innovation) 
and is the preliminary name of a stock company SIVA was working with the establishment of, 
when SIVA and ITF entered into negotiations. NRI is to be organised as a daughter company 
of SIVA, in which SIVA was to gather all shares and minority parts it possessed in strategic 
                                                                                                                                                         
231 Innst.S.nr.232 (1997-98), section 6, page 1, 2&3, 27), 
232 Kunnskaps-og innovasjonssenter på fornebu, http://www.it-fornebu.no/planen/ipsr.asp?id=3.02.01, section 
3.2.1. Nettverk med regionene, 66), 
233 Norgesnett Junior is a project where college students in local schools can get national work tasks, 
234 Stortingsproposisjon 35, (1999-2000) section 4.1.7, page 15 of 20, 45), 
235 see section 6.3, 
 82 
innovation companies, adding up to a total value of approximately NOK147 million237. 
Further the strategy was to accomplish a directed emission in NRI towards the stockholders in 
ITF, and other private investors including SIVA, given that ITF was chosen to develop 
Fornebu and that SIVA would be the governmental agent at Fornebu, and get an equity capital 
increase of NOK260 million238. The emission presupposed that 51% of the shares of NRI was 
acquired by minimum 4 private investors through a cash emission of approximately NOK153 
million, leaving SIVA after the emission, with 49% of the shares in NRI239.  
 
In order to promote creativity and entrepreneurial activity throughout the nation, a business 
incubator with the objective to promote birth of new companies will be established at the IT-, 
knowledge- and innovation centre. The incubator activity shall both consist of running the 
incubator and securing the supply of venture capital to the incubator enterprises. In addition 
some sort of networking collaboration with other knowledge milieus shall be developed, also 
involving the entrepreneurs taking part in the incubator activity. As mentioned earlier the 
present plan is to make the incubator an integrated part of IT Fornebu AS, and it is 
presupposed that IT Fornebu AS will invest in different kinds of activities originating from, 
among others, the incubator, without, however, obligating the shareholders of IT Fornebu AS 
to invest more money in the company. The incubator will as mentioned earlier, be run in close 
co-operation with Forskningsparken AS240.  
  
                                                                                                                                                         
236 Intensjonsavtale between Siva and ITFT, ref. 30), page 3, section 3.1, my translation,  
237 Intensjonsavtale mellom IT Fornebu AS og Siva, page 4, section 4 Etablering av Norsk Regional Innovasjon 
ASA, see ref. 30), 
238 Intensjonsavtale between Siva and ITFT, ref. 30), page 6, section 6.1 & 6.2,  
239 Intensjonsavtale between Siva and ITFT, ref. 30), page 4, section 5.1 & 5.2, 
240 Ref.25), page 6, section 4.1.2, page 13, section 6.2 & 6.3, 
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Another agent which also, according to Per Morten Vigtel241, is supposed to contribute to the 
promotion of entrepreneurial activity is NIFO-tech, which is a company consisting of  
members of Norsk Investorforum and people who previously have gone through an 
entrepreneurial process. A thorough explanation of the operations of NIFO-tech is 
unfortunately not at hand. 
                                                 
241 Information gathered during interview with Per Morten Vigtel, 
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9 Findings and concluding remarks 
9.1  Findings 
The objective of this thesis is, as mentioned in section 1.7, to open the “black box” IT 
Fornebu as much as possible, the time and means given, and through interaction with the 
surroundings endeavour search for the “real” IT Fornebu. During this interactive process the 
picture of IT Fornebu has changed, and the issue of the exploration is a version of IT Fornebu 
which appear more coherent and logical than the initial picture of IT Fornebu once did. The 
issue which contributed to the most surprising alteration of the imaginary IT Fornebu, was the 
importance of the Norwegian state-owned phone company Telenor. Apparently IT Fornebu 
would never have been conceived unless Telenor had decided to build its new gigantic main 
office, housing up to six thousand employees, at Fornebu, and ostensibly it was the news of 
this establishment which triggered the idea about IT Fornebu. Additionally it can be argued 
that because Telenor assessed it as vital for its future competitiveness to be a part of an ICT-
cluster, it is likely that Telenor, as a powerful actor in Norwegian business life and political 
circles, has contributed to the establishment of IT Fornebu during the political process.  
 
From a theoretical point of view the major finding is that it can be argued that the “techno-
economic paradigm”-concept of Carlota Perez and Christopher Freeman is neither coherent 
nor consistent, primarily due to the assertion that the concepts on which it is founded is 
neither consistent nor coherent, as the existence of what is usually referred to as the “long 
wave” in economic growth can be argued is a matter of faith, and as the “technological 
paradigm”-concept of Giovanni Dosi is a vague theoretical notion arguably based on a 
defective understanding of technology. Further, the “techno-economic paradigm”-concept as 
described by NIFO is not identical to that of Carlota Perez, despite the fact that NIFO 
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maintains that this is the case. However, it is not likely to believe that whether or not these 
theoretical issues are coherent have mattered for the IT Fornebu project, as it can be suggested 
that none of the parties involved in the process has special interests in these theoretical 
conceptions, or has the theoretical competence needed in order to raise these questions.  
 
What probably has been more important for IT Fornebu is the fact that Ap at an early stage 
rendered strong support to the establishment of IT Fornebu, and it can be suggested that this 
was a result of a shared basic vision between Fred. Olsen, NIFO and Ap, concerning 
fundamental issues, among others a genuine faith in information technology as a 
revolutionary and transforming power, and if this assumption is legitimate, this would not be 
the first time in Norwegian history that the government and private interests find together in 
order to build the nation242. As the process with opening the “black box” IT Fornebu has been 
progressing, a quite complex network of alliances between major actors in the Norwegian 
business- and political life has been revealed, and it could be implied that the establishment of 
IT Fornebu is a result of interaction between many parties, which through IT Fornebu could 
find a common means of accomplishing separate goals. 
 
 
9.2  Status quo 
9.2.1   Obstructions 
Six months have past since it was decided that IT Fornebu Technoport was the tender given 
the task to develop the IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre at Fornebu, but unfortunately 
progress has not been as expected. By March 7, 2000, the premises seemed the best for an 
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immediate start on the first chapter in the building of “a World Class Knowledge and 
Innovation Community..”. The site was apparently reallocated from an airport of asphalt and 
concrete, to a small environmentally friendly colourful society, with lots of green lounges and 
large areas for outdoor life and recreation, where information technology, creativity and 
knowledge could flourish and grow. According to Per Morten Vigtel243, the leader of NIFO, 
the main reason for the slow development process is the fact that the Norwegian Parliament 
allowed Bærum County Council to be the regulating authority of the Fornebu area and not the 
Norwegian State. The major problem connected to Bærum County Council is, that as the 
regulating authority it maintains that no building activity will be allowed inside or outside 
existing buildings at Fornebu, before a notion concerning transportation on rails serving the 
Fornebu area, is carried in the Norwegian Parliament, Stortinget244. Stortinget on the other 
hand, has not yet started dealing with this matter which probably will be both controversial 
and time consuming, and in addition it will take time both to build and get into operation 
whatever is decided for. After negotiations, however, Bærum County Council has granted 
permission for IT Fornebu to start utilising an area of 10000 m2 inside the old registration 
building at Fornebu, prior to the eventual decision in Stortinget245. Whether the transportation 
on rail issue will cause a major delay to the IT Fornebu project in the future is hard to say, but 
according to Per Morten Vigtel, the major interests involved in the matter will in all likelihood 
contribute to a satisfactory solution to the problem. 
 
Another matter which has postponed the execution of the agreement between the Norwegian 
State and IT Fornebu Technoport (the Agreement) is the fact that Norway is a member of 
EFTA (European Free Trade Association), and because of this the Ministry of Labour and 
                                                                                                                                                         
242 An example of this is Akergruppen as mentioned in section 5.3, 
243 Final interview with Per Morten Vigtel, 
244 Kommunedelplan 2, Fornebu area, ref.34), page 17, Kollektivsystem, page 44, Kollektivtransport, 
245 Final interview with Per Morten Vigtel, 
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Government Administration, in the end of May this year, sent a notification concerning the IT 
Fornebu matter to EFTA in Brussels246. The notification was supposed to be a thorough 
explanation concerning the governmental part and all agreements involved in the IT Fornebu 
matter. ESA, which is the EFTA-members parallel to the EEC-commission is assessing the 
notification to see whether it is in conflict with the EEA-regulations. If there is nothing to 
react against the treatment of the case will approximately take a couple of months, but if 
further explanation is required due to doubts or obscurities in the matter, a more formal 
assessment will be necessary. According to Per Morten Vigtel247, the signals received so far is 
that no extraordinary delay will occur due to ESA, and he expects the final approval of the 
Agreement to be due by the end of the fall 2000, something which signifies that the property 
at Fornebu will not be conveyed until the end of this year. 
9.2.2   Progress 
August 31st, 2000, IT Fornebu AS held a press conference announcing the formation of a 
syndicate constituted by Telenor, Compaq, Cisco Systems and Hewlett-Packard, with the 
overall objective to turn Fornebu into the best trial area for highly developed electronic 
networks. The first task of the syndicate is to start the necessary development under the 
project name IT Fornebu ePort248, and as part of this work they will operate from the 
registration building, and according to Vigtel, people working for the syndicate are expected 
to move into office facilities at Fornebu quite soon. Telenor, for example, which is a major 
contributor to both IT Fornebu and the syndicate, is planning, by the end of October this year, 
to start utilising approximately 3000 m2 in the registration building for office facilities, and in 
addition a “centre of excellent research” are expected to move into the registration building by 
first quarter 2001.  
                                                 
246 Newspaper article, see ref.47), ESA-....., 
247 Final interview with Per Morten Vigtel, 
248 IT Fornebu homepage, see ref.62), http://www.it-fornebu.no/artikkel.asp?id=121, 19.09.00, 10:00 hrs, 
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9.3  An ICT-cluster? 
According to Phil Cooke, a cluster is “difficult or impossible to build from zero”249, but IT 
Fornebu will not be built totally from scratch. Telenor, which is an established company with 
approximately 6000 employees including a research department, is going to be in full 
operation at Fornebu some time during year 2002. In addition several subcontractors have 
already notified Telenor that they are interested in some kind of co-localisation with Telenor 
at Fornebu250. Further the Norwegian Institute of Technology is going to move some of the 
higher education to Fornebu making it possible for this part of the educational programme to 
interact with Telenor. This in turn may improve the quality of the Norwegian IT- and 
telecommunication educational programme, since the proximity to Telenor might increase 
salaries and improve other job facilities. Of course this might not be very favourable to the 
remaining part of the university unless similar arrangements is provided for where they are 
presently located. Whether or not IT Fornebu will be a success, can be argued is a matter of 
who is looking, but it is likely to believe that IT Fornebu has very good possibilities in serving 
its purpose if taking the stand of Telenor, but this does not necessarily signify that IT Fornebu 
will fill the objective of being a node in the national network.  
 
Norway is a small country, and has little expertise concerning both creation and promotion of 
entrepreneurial activity. In a cluster like Silicon Valley with more inhabitants than Norway, 
the cluster acts more or less like some kind of gigantic institution251, with expert venture 
capitalists, expert lawyers and expert support organisations etc. all working for promoting 
entrepreneurial activity within the cluster. If this is transferred to Norwegian standards, where 
a cluster might consist of perhaps 25 companies, they would not be able to afford this kind of 
                                                 
249 Reference 81), Phil Cooke, lecture,  
250 Interview with Ole Petter Håkonsen, Telenor 
251 Phil Cooke, ref.81), 
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support organisation, and if they perhaps could afford an expert lawyer, it is not certain that it 
would exist any for them to employ. If, lets say, IT Fornebu manage to establish an incubator 
service with an expert support organisation, this would probably help entrepreneurial activity 
in the capital region, or at least at Fornebu, but the ambitions for the IT-, knowledge- and 
innovation centre at Fornebu is not just to support the capital region, but the whole nation. 
What the support organisation at Fornebu then would have to do, was to function as a 
counselling organisation for all entrepreneurs throughout the country, making the whole 
country function as a gigantic ICT-cluster, and it can be argued that, if this succeeds, it will be 
the first time in history that “clustering functions” is established without the companies 
involved being in geographical proximity.  
 
It is very hard to predict anything concerning the regional effects of IT Fornebu, and it can be 
argued that it is difficult to see exactly how IT Fornebu AS is going accomplish the 
injunctions given by Stortinget. Very little concrete are written about this in IT Fornebu’s 
publications and in the tender delivered the Government, something which also the 
Government points out when assessing the tender252. It has been maintained by several of the 
opponents to IT Fornebu, that the project will vacuum the countryside for qualified IT 
personnel, as apparently one of the problems with cluster policy is that some places win and 
some loose253. IT Fornebu on the other hand, argue that the Oslo region at present is 
hoovering the rest of the country for IT personnel, and that IT Fornebu will reduce the 
pressure on the regions because it will contribute to increasing the educational capacity in 
ICT-sciences in the Oslo region, enabling the IT-personnel educated in the regions to work in 
the regions254. To dam up for a general lack of IT-personnel in Norway, the government is 
continuously increasing the educational capacity in IT-sciences, and it will be interesting to 
                                                 
252 Stortingsproposisjon 35, (1999-2000), 45), section 4.1.7, page 15 of 20, 
253 Phil Cooke, ref. 81), 
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see whether we in a few years time will experience that far too many people have educational 
background in IT, like the case once was in petroleum science.  
9.4  Success criteria 
Another interesting issue is which criteria should be used in the future in order to evaluate the 
degree of success or failure of the IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre. To NIFO, IT 
Fornebu is a complete failure if it turns out to be just a property deal, but the amazing thing is 
that it may be an economic success as an IT-, knowledge- and innovation centre, and still be a 
failure to NIFO. Unless IT Fornebu turns out to be a political agent demonstrating the, in 
NIFO’s opinion, necessary changes which have to be made in the Norwegian trade- and 
industry policy, IT Fornebu has not served its intended purpose255, and it should within a year 
be possible to imply something concerning this issue. Long prior to when the buildings are 
finished, agreements concerning the operation of the centre should be established, hence, it 
should be possible to say something concerning the success of IT Fornebu in a couple of years 
time. What Vigtel asserts as most important for the success of the centre as such, is i) the 
number of international companies performing developing activities at Fornebu, ii) the 
number of key personnel moving to Fornebu from abroad, and iii) whether or not the 
incubator activity manage to promote entrepreneurial activity throughout the nation. It is 
difficult to evaluate what kind of success criteria which ought to be utilised when evaluating 
IT Fornebu, as many of the elements which contribute to the success, such as networking, 
interaction, co-operation, interplay, communication, etc., are not measurable, and it can be 
suggested that the most interesting question to follow up on, is whether or not IT Fornebu will 
be a node in the national network and accomplish to create a national “cluster” without the 
companies involved being in geographical proximity. 
                                                                                                                                                         
254http://www.it-fornebu.no/planen/ipsr.asp?id=3.02.01, 2.10.00, 01:01 hrs, IT Fornebu Planen, 66), 
255 Interview with Per Morten Vigtel, 
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